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A new era

2011-02-14T07:54:00.000-05:00

To our wonderful readership base:

We are incredibly pleased to announce that Yankeeist has decided to merge with our good friends and like-minded analytical seamheads at The Yankee U to create a brand-new one-stop shop for all of your statistically-driven Yankee blogging needs:

The Yankee Analysts

Aside from having to adjust your bookmarks to reflect our shiny new URL, this changes absolutely nothing regarding the hard-hitting, deep analytical content you've come to know and love from the Yankeeist team. Mike, Matt and I will continue to write at as a feverish a pace as we can, only now you'll have more reasons to keep coming back over and over and over, as our expanded writing staff will be posting new Yankee content all throughout the day, every single day of the week.

Needless to say, we are very excited to be teaming up with our pals at TYU, who you likely already read every day anyway, and combining our efforts will result in an end product unlike anything else in the Yankee blogosphere.

So once again, please join us immediately at our new blogging home, The Yankee Analysts. We'll keep Yankeeist up in case one of us has something to share that doesn't necessarily make sense at TYA, but TYA is our new HQ.

We'd like to take a moment to thank each and every one of you who have made Yankeeist a part of your daily routine -- you are the reason Yankeeist is what it is today -- and we look forward to seeing you over at our new digs. If you have any comments or questions, feel free to leave them in this thread, or preferably at the new site, or e-mail me at Yankeeist at Gmail dot com.

Yankeeist Live Chat | February 11, 2011

2011-02-11T15:00:00.002-05:00

Yankeeist Chat Reminder | TODAY (Friday February 11, 2011)

2011-02-11T12:00:00.003-05:00

Be sure to join Mike and me for the first 2011 Yankeeist Live Chat this afternoon (Friday February 11, at 3:00 PM EST). There's a lot going on in Yankeeland (state of the rotation, bench depth, bullpen additions, Brian Cashman, etc.) and we can certainly hit on all of them.

I look forward to seeing you there!

Just say (Liria)no

2011-02-11T08:44:00.000-05:00

I may be in the minority, but I'm just not terribly excited by the prospect of the Yankees potentially trading for Francisco Liriano, which is why I hadn't bothered to comment on it. But given the number of smart people taking serious looks at it, it seemed worth weighing in on.

Liriano had an unequivocally spectacular year in 2010. 6.0 fWAR (4th-highest total in the AL in 2010) seasons for pitchers don't exactly grow on trees, nor do 2.66 FIPs over 191.2 innings. Pretty much everything went right for Liriano in 2010: spectacular K/9 (9.44), low-ish BB/9 (2.72), nearly nonexistent HR/9 (0.42) and a superb GB% (53.6%). His season likely would've been one for the ages had he not surrendered a .331 BABIP -- a mark around the 10th percentile, and by far the worst mark of the top ten AL fWAR pitchers -- and been able to strand runners slightly more effectively than 1.1 basis points above average (73.1%), numbers that led to Liriano not only significantly outpitching his 3.62 ERA, but recording the highest positive delta between his ERA and FIP in the AL.

I cite all of this ostensibly to say "let's see it again." We know Liriano can be a great pitcher, but he's really only done it twice -- in 2006 (before injuries derailed him for about two-and-a-half seasons) and last season. There's certainly a lot to like about the idea of a 27-year-old lefthanded near-ace pitching for the Yankees (and again, I'm applying the "near-ace" tag solely because I don't think Liriano's done it long enough to be considered a true number-one) who also had the best slider in the American League in 2010. There's also some concern, regarding whether or not he can stay healthy enough to repeat his elite 2010, along with the fact that he's only under team control for two more seasons.

If this were a Matt Garza situation where you had three more years of team control, maybe you start thinking about unloading some of your top talent. But for all of Liriano's excellence, I can't fathom giving up a bat the likes of which the Yankee farm system has in all likelihood never produced during many of our lifetimes, and I'm be highly reluctant to part with any of the B's, despite the fact that we have no idea whether any of them will end up panning out.

If I'm the Yankees, I sit this one out, unless the asking price drops from Jesus Montero and Manny Banuelos to a package of second-tier prospects. Hey, the Mets were able to extract Johan Santana for yesterday's garbage, so stranger things have certainly happened. However, you know Bill Smith will ask for the sun, the moon and the stars from the Yanks given that they're both in the AL, not to mention the fact that the Yankees have likely come to symbolize quite a bit of frustration on the part of Twins' fans. Smith would really have to be blown away to trade the team's best pitcher to the Yankees. At the end of the day the Yankees need to pass and wait until the end of the 2012 season, at which point we'll know if Liriano's still the goods, and if so, the team can make as lavish an offer as they see fit without surrendering prospects.

Is there any chance Bartolo Colon has something left in the tank?

2011-02-11T08:15:00.000-05:00

During his playing days I routinely called Bartolo Colon "Big Fat Bartolo Colon" and Krispy Kreme. Despite this, I was indifferent when the Yankees signed him to a minor league contract this offseason for reasons my co-author Matt Warden voiced best. The Yankees have money to burn, this year especially. The cost of one minor league contract is, literally, nothing to the team. Once upon a time Krispy Kreme was a good pitcher. Given that his contract is worth about $0 to the Bombers, he represents nothing but upside. If it turns out he has something left in that voluminous gut of his then the Yankees win. If not, no one loses. With that in mind, Larry suggested we investigate whether or not the numbers suggest Colon has anything left to offer the Yankees in 2011.

The data below are taken from Baseball-Reference and Fangraphs. I've captured everything Colon has done in the majors since 2002 through 2009, the last time he pitched in the big leagues.

That table isn't very encouraging. Krispy's career stats show that once upon a time he was a reliable pitcher. Unfortunately, that appears to be based largely on what he did from 1998 to 2005. After being a reliable innings eater year-in-year-out, Colon hasn't pitched more than 100 innings since 2005 and hasn't come close since 2007. After missing all of 2010, it seems unlikely that Bartolo will be able to make the team this season, let alone give the Yankees much in the way of durability.

Digging a bit deeper, it appears that Colon also became inconsistent beginning in the 2004 season. After never posting an ERA above 4.09 since he had become a frontline starter, Colon saw his ERA bloat to 5.01 in 2004, his first subpar full season in the majors. After that, apart from his 2005 campaign, his WHIP elevated permanently, and his ERA and FIP bounced around from being good in some seasons to bad in others. The combined picture is one of a player who has a fork sticking out of his back, not one who is primed for a comeback.

Once upon a time Big Fat Bartolo Colon was a good pitcher. He broke into the majors with the Indians in 1997 and settled into their rotation. He also peaked with them, posting a 121 ERA+ and a 1.363 WHIP over six seasons in Cleveland. Unfortunately for the Yankees, a variety of metrics suggest that time has passed. Colon didn't appear to have much left in the tank the last time he pitched in the majors. It's unlikely he has anything now. Making matters worse, according to Baseball-Reference the pitcher he's most similar to through his career is Freddy Garcia. You can't make this stuff up.

Is there any hope for Freddy Garcia?

2011-02-10T08:15:00.003-05:00

In the aftermath of the Freddy Garcia signing I mentioned that if I felt so inspired I'd dig into the numbers to "see if there are any curiosities in his recent poor performance that might suggest a turnaround," and of course my buddy Joe beat me to the punch to a certain extent in noting that Garcia's 2010 changeup was actually a pretty effective weapon against lefties.

For my deeper look at Garcia I thought I'd analyze the PitchFX data, to see whether anything instructive or informative might arise. First, a quick look at Garcia's stats going back the last three seasons, as that's as far back as the PitchFX data goes:

Unfortunately, outside of last season Garcia's seen pretty limited action while also performing rather poorly, so these small samples aren't all that instructive, but as it's all we have they can at least provide us with some guidance.

Garcia's best performance during the last four seasons came during the nine starts he made in 2009 -- not surprisingly that season featured his best GB% since 2005 and the first time in his career he walked less than two batters per nine innings.

While Garcia strikes righties out more frequently then lefties and walks them less frequently, for whatever reason he has some issues with surrendering the long ball to righthanded batters, which is reflected in his FIP, which was higher vs. righties in every season except 2009. However, given that it's slightly harder to hit a home run at Yankee Stadium hitting righthanded than lefthanded (RHB HR Park Factor of 110 vs. LHB Park Factor of 124) -- though YS still plays as an above-average HR park for RHB -- maybe Garcia will have slightly better luck keeping the ball in the park against same-handed batters. Although given that none of the projection systems see a HR/9 lower than 1.1 (with PECOTA projecting a particularly brutal 1.4) I wouldn't go holding my breath.

Here's the horizontal and vertical break for Freddy's four main pitches (I excluded the splitter -- even though Fangraphs has wSF data for Garcia, they only have h-break and v-break for 2010, so there didn't seem to be much utility in including).

In his lone good year of 2009, Garcia's changeup was worth 3.4 runs above average, and broke about two inches less than league average horizontally and about two inches higher vertically. The pitch was even more effective in 2010, and while it essentially had league-average horizontal break, it once again broke more than two inches higher than the league, so it would appear that if Freddy can throw his change with 6-7 inches of elevation it will remain a good pitch for him.

Garcia's fastball was pretty awful last year, and actually worse than Javier Vazquez's 89mph avg., -3.5 runs above average offering. Garcia had similar H-break on his fastball, but elevated it an inch-and-a-half higher than Javy -- and nearly two inches higher than the league -- and so while elevation may be the name of the game for Freddy's change, he throws his fastball too high and as a result it more or less gets crushed.

His slider was solid in 2009, but though its H-break and V-break barely changed in 2010, he lost about a mile-and-a-half of velocity on it, which was enough to turn the pitch from an asset to a detriment. If Freddy can't get the slider back up to 81 he's going to have to limit its usage (he threw it more than a quarter of the time last season, down from 2009's 29% but way up from 2008's admittedly abbreviated 13%. In 2007 he threw it 14% of the time).

His 2010 curve was OK, but nothing to get terribly excited over. He throws it significantly slower than the league average curveball -- given the near 20-mph difference between his curve and fastball, if he locates it well it's probably a pretty nice pitch to have in his back pocket.

Unfortunately a deeper dig into some of the numbers hasn't really yielded anything profoundly positive that might suggest a stronger 2011 campaign for Freddy Garcia. He'll have to continue the effective deployment of his changeup to be of any use, while perhaps mixing in his curveball a bit more often (only 5% of the time last season) to keep hitters off balance so they're not sitting on a fat 88mph fastball.

More on Adam Warren

2011-02-09T15:44:00.004-05:00

Didn't get enough Adam Warren the other day? Frankie Piliere had some kind words for the farm system's best-projected starter in his latest chat:

"[Comment From ZakZak: ]
Adam Warren is one of my personal favorite from the Yankees farm system, seems like he doesn't get too much love as he's always grouped with David Phelps, D.J. Mitchell, etc as a backend of the rotation starter. I'm not saying he's front line, but isn't he at least worthy of a middle of the rotation type? He's got good stuff!

Frankie Piliere: I like Warren better than the two others you mentioned. You're right that he probably doesn't get quite enough love. He's not a finesse guy. He runs up into the mid 90s at times and relies on that fastball. But his secondary stuff continues to improve. He's a middle-of-the-rotation starter."

While it seems silly to get excited over a guy who's projected as a mid-rotation starter at best, I'm still very interested in seeing what Warren can do.

Yankees sign righthanded reliever Luis Ayala

2011-02-09T15:22:00.000-05:00

The Yankees have signed relief pitcher Luis Ayala to a minor-league contract. Per MLBTR, it is expected that Ayala will compete for a bullpen spot with the likes of Neil Cotts, Buddy Carlyle and Mark Prior.

Ayala last pitched in the Majors in 2009 and was pretty bad, throwing 40 innings of 5.63 ERA/4.67 FIP ball worth 0.0 fWAR. A quick glance at Ayala's ledger reveals that the only good season he's ever had came back in 2004 with the Expos, when he threw 90.1 innings of 2.69 ERA/3.18 FIP ball, worth 1.8 fWAR. He hasn't had a BB/9 below 2 since 2005, or a GB% above 50% since 2004 -- not that the latter is crucial for relief success, but for a guy with a 5.88 career K/9 you'd hope he'd generate his share of grounders. I suppose the career 47.3% GB% is something to hang his hat on.

In any event, this is yet another low-cost, no-risk move that will either benefit the team in the best case or be completely forgotten about if it doesn't pan out.

Yankeeist Chat Reminder | Friday, February 11, 2011

2011-02-09T15:00:00.003-05:00

Be sure to join me for the first 2011 Yankeeist Live Chat this Friday, February 11, at 3:00 PM EST. There's a lot going on in Yankeeland (state of the rotation, bench depth, bullpen additions, Brian Cashman, etc.) and we can certainly hit on all of them.

I look forward to seeing you there!

Ten Years of Spending | 1990s edition

2011-02-09T08:15:00.008-05:00

Much to my delight, I recently stumbled onto an excellent article by THT’s Matt Binder contemplating league spending from 2001-2010. As you’re probably aware, the Yankees' accomplishments over the past decade tend to reflect quite favorably when compared against the rest of Major League Baseball. After assessing the trends, Matt affirms:

"In each of the past 10 years, the teams that have spent the most on payroll in their division, or the second-most, have made the playoffs 49 times—27 times in the American League and 22 times in the National. During the same time, the bottom two teams in payroll spending have made the playoffs 16 times; 11 in the American and five in the National. … In conclusion, spending a lot of money is [generally] good for your team's record."

Given the polarizing nature of MLB’s drastic disparities in spending and the Yankees' reputation of being the financial juggernaut that continues to exasperate the condition, I thought it’d be fun to repeat Matt’s exercise during the 1990s. By examining spending during New York’s most recent dynasty years, perhaps we’ll be able to determine if the league was more financially equivalent back then, and if it was, whether that yielded more equitable results.

The American League East

Average percentage of league mean: 127%

During the 1990s, each member of the AL East (with the exception of the Brewers who I'll be discussing a bit later) followed a fairly linear upward trend that both demonstrated the division’s ever-increasing competitiveness and the developing financial inequality that would increasingly engulf the rest of baseball. As to be expected, most teams in this division operated well above MLB average spending; cumulatively the group catapulted past league average at a rate of 127%. Obviously, this made the Devil Rays' transition into the league as an expansion team challenging for the first ~~few~~ ten seasons or so -- but then again, no one said contending perennially with Big Stein’s Bombers would be a cakewalk.

Under Steinbrenner’s tutelage, the Yankees significantly hovered above the other teams in spending, even doubling the Rays' spending by the year 2000. From 1991 to 2000, the Yankees payroll simply climbed every year at what seemed liked an exponential rate. By the time the decade drew to an end, the Yankees' spending had risen over 300% ($92.9M in 2000) since the start of the decade coinciding with six postseason appearances and three World Championships. Of course, these values appear rather pedestrian nowadays as that type of money is allocated to literally a handful of guys wearing pinstripes (that means you too, Derek Jeter).

What I find particularly interesting about this timeframe though, is it signifies a period where the Orioles were actually “plus spenders” in relation to the league mean, and the Red Sox were largely a footnote in overall success despite maintaining a competitively operating franchise in terms of payroll (in addition to notching three postseason appearances).

The American League Central

Average percentage of league mean: 87%

The AL Central isn’t quite so neatly organized in terms of overall trending and was the lowest-spending division on average, with the Indians being the only the team consistently outspending the league mean. What’s even more incredible though, was how the Indians operated in contrast to the rest of the teams in the grouping.

The MLB average spending from 1991-2000 was approximately $31.3M. From 1996-2000, the Indians spending spiked dramatically above the MLB mean and hovered around $61.8M. Although a World Championship was never in their cards, they did manage to obtain five postseason appearances (one climaxing in a 4-2 World Series defeat to the Braves), and were clearly the dominating force in the AL Central during the latter half of the decade both fiscally and statistically. On a slightly derisive note, it’s also the last time I remember a Cleveland baseball team upholding sustained success in my lifetime.

During the 1994-1997 seasons, the Brewers were reassigned to the AL Central. During this time span the MLB spending average was approximately $33.2M. The Brewers countered with a payroll approximately 60% that amount averaging approximately $20.2M during those years. By this point, MLB was in a state of flux in terms of divisional alignment. Once 1998 rolled around, Bud Selig had the team repositioned once more to their current residence, the NL Central.

The American League West

Average percentage of league mean: 100%

The AL West essentially mirrored the trending of the rest of baseball. The only real fluctuations were those of the Rangers and Athletics which basically offset each other in terms of cumulative spending totals. During the 90s the Rangers were spending an average of $44.5M with substantial spikes in 1999 and 2000 ($81.3M and $70.7M, respectively) on players like Nolan Ryan, Ruben Sierra, Rafael Palmeiro, Jose Canseco, Kevin Brown, Will Clark, Juan Gonzalez, Ivan Rodriguez and Kenny Rogers.

Around 1996, the Athletics began their descent into frugality which eventually led to their mystical-financially-prudent-sabermetric-approach-to-survival otherwise known as Moneyball, while Alex Rodriguez (who would later cripple Texas’ checkbook) was still categorized in the major-production-at-an-only-moderately-expensive-cost column for Seattle. These three teams netted eight postseason appearances while the then-hapless Angels (who would decidedly turn it around in the 2000s) idled in the world of relatively cheap mediocrity.

The National League East

Average percentage of league mean: 92%

The Braves' dominance of the decade was unsurprisingly underscored by a willingness to spend. In a division that spent an average of $33.3M, or 92% of MLB mean spending, Atlanta consistently went above and beyond. From 1992 through the remainder of the decade they averaged $52.5M, topping out at $82.7M in 2000. During that time, the Braves accumulated nine postseason appearances and a World Championship in 1995. Given the effectiveness of Atlanta’s out-of-this-world rotation stewarded by Greg Maddux, John Smoltz, and Tom Glavine, I can only imagine the angst experienced by fans of NL teams not hailing out of Georgia. What I can imagine, though, are the feelings inspired by one team who did manage to beat the pride of NL East when it counted most, on multiple occasions, mind you (sorry, too much?).

Meanwhile, the Montreal Expos' spending maintained a fairly consistent level of “pitiful” as it rested at approximately $17.5M. The cost of a skinflint-oriented operation was zero postseason appearances and increased motivation to relocate.

The Marlins, on the other hand, while largely operating under MLB average at approximately $26M, at least had the excuse of being a newly founded franchise (which would then have to compete with another Florida-based team later in the decade). However, there was that exceptional 1997 season when Florida was freakishly good, resulting in a World Series Championship at the inflated cost of $47.7M in expenses (nearly doubling their average up until that point).

The National League Central

Average percentage of league mean: 92%

Unfortunately, the NL Central left quite a bit to be desired as it typically does. The division averaged 92% of the league’s mean spending, and the results were mostly unmemorable. The paltry Pirates matched expectations as they fulfilled their most-likely-to-quit-baseball-and-try-a-new-sport superlative. They averaged a $21.1M payroll over the course of the decade which was weighed down by a measly $9.1M in 1997. To really put 1997 in perspective, the top-spending Reds outspent the Pirates by $37.1M. Although Pittsburgh did have playoff appearances in 1991 and 1992, they also eventually morphed into the organization boasting the most consecutive losing seasons (18 and counting!) thus disgracing a typically well represented sports town.

As for the Reds, they primarily spent the most dollars in the quest for divisional supremacy before ultimately being usurped by the Cubs in 1998. These two lousy teams managed a combined postseason appearance total of two over the course of 10 years and demonstrated fine examples of generally inept organizational execution (perhaps matched most closely by the current rendition of the Mets).

The National League West

Average percentage of league mean: 107%

The NL West displays the most consistency of any of the divisions in terms of trending. Communally, the NL West's dollars spent ($38.8M) averages slightly above league average. This is especially impressive as it contained two new teams (the Rockies and Diamondbacks) who both veered away from Tampa Bay’s try-to-get-ballplayers-to-play-for-free business model.

The Dodgers were fairly steadfast in leading the league at $46.9M, although in the final two years surveyed, their total spiked rather precipitously (thanks in large part to Gary Sheffield and NY “fan-favorite” Kevin Brown). Unfortunately for the LA faithful, the team had relatively little to show for it. Thankfully, the Padres, who were fourth in total spending, were content in taking the majority of losses over the course of these years, and graciously accepted/embraced their one playoff appearance.

The Diamondbacks came out of the gates aggressively in 1999 (their second season as a franchise) with a payroll surpassing the $70M plateau and were rewarded with an NLDS thrashing compliments of the Braves. Since then, their big spending sustainability has dwindled given the limitations of their market.

Division vs. Division

All in all, the AL East completely overshadowed the rest of baseball in spending during the Yankees' late ‘90s glory years, and the Bombers generally overshadowed their competition in both spending along with results. It is important to remember though, that during this decade, the league was changing. Technically, the intraleague divisions weren't established until 1994 when the National League was expanded to 14 teams (and interleague play didn't begin until 1997).

While big money never guarantees anything, it clearly worked to Steinbrenner’s advantage during this period. Consider the weighted averages of dollars spent against the league average over the years.

New York Yankees	1.484	(1st in division, 6 playoff appearances)
Atlanta Braves	1.324	(1st in division, 9 playoff appearances)
Los Angeles Dodgers	1.271	(1st in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Boston Red Sox	1.263	(2nd in division, 3 playoff appearances)
Baltimore Orioles	1.234	(3rd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Toronto Blue Jays	1.212	(4th in division, 3 playoff appearances)

Texas Rangers	1.187	(1st in division, 3 playoff appearances)
New York Mets	1.167	(2nd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Chicago Cubs	1.099	(1st in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Cleveland Indians	1.077	(1st in division, 5 playoff appearances)
Cincinnati Reds	1.076	(2nd in division, 1 playoff appearance)
San Francisco Giants	1.075	(2nd in division, 2 playoff appearances)

St. Louis Cardinals	1.018	(3rd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Chicago White Sox	0.996	(2nd in division, 2playoff appearances)
Seattle Mariners	0.995	(2nd in division, 3 playoff appearances)
Los Angeles Angels	0.941	(3rd in division, 0 playoff appearances)
Detroit Tigers	0.904	(3rd in division, 0 playoff appearances)
Oakland Athletics	0.882	(4th in division, 2 playoff appearances)

Kansas City Royals	0.874	(4th in division, 0 playoff appearances)
San Diego Padres	0.872	(3rd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Houston Astros	0.867	(4th in division, 3 playoff appearances)
Philadelphia Phillies	0.859	(3rd in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Colorado Rockies	0.763	(4th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Milwaukee Brewers	0.754	(5th in division, 0 playoff appearances)

Minnesota Twins	0.701	(5th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Pittsburgh Pirates	0.621	(6th in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Florida Marlins	0.568	(4th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Montreal Expos (Nats)	0.498	(5th in division, 0 playoff appearances)
Arizona Diamondbacks	0.360	(5th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Tampa Bay Devil Rays	0.257	(5th in division, 0 playoff appearances)

Without ample spending, the “Core-4” may have been unable to remain intact just as the supreme pitching of Atlanta might not have been under team control for nearly as long. If anything, I also have one more reason to appreciate the Astros' organization, as they achieved three playoff appearances despite operating under the average MLB budget and holding steadfast as the second-to-last in spending within their division -- basically acting as the “Billy Beane squad” of the NL West.

For those skeptics out there, consider this. The top two teams in each American League division in terms of team payroll made the postseason 23 times. The same set of criteria yielded 19 appearances from the NL for a combined 42 total postseason opportunities. On the other hand, the two lowest spending teams from each division within the AL reached the playoffs only two times and only six in the NL combining for a measly eight total.

Granted, the ‘90s were a strange time in terms of postseason play. The 1991-1993 seasons did not have the ALDS round and there were no playoffs in 1994 altogether. With that being said, I’m not sure how drastic of a difference it would have made for the small market teams. Perhaps where an opportunity might have arisen had there been additional playoff slots would be for the “middle-of-the-pack #3” teams who were on the threshold of competing more regularly such as the Cardinals or White Sox.

Here’s a more granular breakdown.

Top two teams in payroll per year that made the playoffs:

AL East: (1992, 1993 Blue Jays) (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 Yankees) (1996, 1997 Orioles) (1992, 1999 Red Sox)

AL Central: (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Indians)

AL West: (1992 Athletics) (1995, 1997, 2000 Mariners) (1996, 1998, 1999 Rangers)

NL East: (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 Braves) (1997 Marlins) (1999, 2000 Mets)

NL Central: (1994 Reds) (1996, 2000 Cardinals) (1998 Cubs) (1999 Astros)

NL West: (1995 Rockies) (1996 Dodgers) (1999 Diamondbacks)

American League total: 23

National League total: 19

MLB total: 42

Bottom two teams in payroll per year that made the playoffs:

AL East: (1995 Red Sox)
AL Central: None
AL West: (2000 Athletics)
NL East: (1991 Braves)
NL Central: (1997 Astros)
NL West: (1995 Dodgers) (1996 Padres) (1997, 2000 Giants)

American League total: 2
National League total: 6
MLB total: 8

15 highest spending in relation to league average:

1. 1999 Yankees (1.830 times the league average) [World Champions]
2. 1998 Orioles (1.745) [no playoffs]
3. 1999 Rangers (1.688)
4. 2000 Yankees (1.664) [World Champions]
5. 1996 Yankees (1.631) [World Champions]
6. 2000 Dodgers (1.618) [did not make playoffs]
7. 1995 Blue Jays (1.581) [did not make playoffs]
8. 1998 Yankees (1.566) [World Champions]
9. 1999 Braves (1.559)
10. 1997 Yankees (1.556)
11. 1999 Indians (1.533)
12. 1996 Orioles (1.523)
13. 1996 Braves (1.498) [World Champions]
14. 1993 Jays (1.495) [World Champions]
15. 1999 Red Sox (1.489)

15 lowest spending in relation to league average*:

1. 1998 Expos (Nats) (0.228)
2. 1997 Pirates (0.239)
3. 1992 Indians (0.273)
4. 2000 Twins (0.280)
5. 1993 Rockies (0.289)
6. 1999 Marlins (0.315)
7. 1999 Twins (0.340)
8. 1999 Expos (0.340)
9. 1998 Pirates (0.341)
10. 1999 Royals (0.343)
11. 2000 Marlins (0.356)
12. 1995 Expos (0.382)
13. 2000 Royals (0.414)
14. 1994 Padres (0.428)
15. 1997 Tigers (0.429)

*Of the teams qualified, not one made the postseason during the respective year listed.

Suffice it to say, the numbers speak for themselves. In regard to the questions listed in my thesis above, I’d say the answers are fairly self evident.

A) Was the league was more financially equivalent back then? No, not really. While the overall dollars spent were less back then, the proportions of payroll allocation trending behaved in much the same way as it does currently.
B) ~~If it was, did it yielded more equitable results?~~
C) Were the results as disproportionately skewed? I guess that depends on who you ask. Those of us who are Yankees or Braves fans have no gripe with the way things worked out.

Resources:
USA Today MLB salary database
Baseball-Reference (Playoff and World Series Index)

Bizarre Moves from Seasons Past: The non-signing of Ted Lilly in the 2006-2007 offseason

2011-02-08T11:15:00.002-05:00

Ah, the Bizarre Moves from Seasons Past series. I had a lot of fun with this last offseason, but I hadn't penned one this year, primarily due to the fact that no ideas for new posts had popped into my head. Until now. I previously covered the trading of Mike Lowell, the non-signing of David Ortiz, the non-signing of Andy Pettitte after the 2003 season, the non-signing of Vladimir Guerrero and the non-signing of Carlos Beltran.

As fate would have it, the last time we published a "Bizarre Moves" post it focused on Ted Lilly, and once again the man born Theodore Roosevelt Lilly III takes center stage (after a cameo yesterday).

As noted in that prior BMfSP post, the Yankees had questionably traded Lilly in a three-way deal between the A's and the Tigers that resulted in New York acquiring the heralded Jeff Weaver, who spent a tumultuous year-and-a-half in pinstripes before essentially being run out of town and replaced by a nearing-the-end-of-the-line Kevin Brown.

However, despite dishing arguably their best left-handed pitching prospect since Andy Pettitte and getting garbage in return, the Yankees had an opportunity to bring Lilly back into the fold during the 2006-2007 offseason, as Lilly hit free agency for the first time. Despite three above-average seasons (and one terrible year in 2005), I seem to recall most of the Yankee blogs I was reading at the time being against the idea of a Lilly reunion (although I'm having trouble remembering who expressed these opinions), fearing he'd be overpaid and ineffective. It was also thought that the Yankees would likely end up getting Daisuke Matsuzaka, until the Red Sox shocked the league and outbid every other team by a considerable margin.

In the aftermath of missing out on Matsuzaka, Brian Cashman followed one of the most ill-advised recommendations in team history and signed a Japanese hurler of his own in Kei Igawa. Igawa cost $26 million in posting fees and signed a five-year, $20 million that finally ends after this coming season. Nine days after the Yankees won the rights to Igawa, the Cubs signed Ted Lilly to a four-year, $40 million contract on December 8, or $6 million less than the Yankees ended up having to spend on Igawa. Read that last sentence to yourself again. Now feel free to puke.

We're going to do this two ways. First we'll do a graphical rundown of Lilly vs. Weaver in the three years leading up to the 2002 trade (Lilly and Weaver both conveniently debuted in 1999); the one-and-half seasons that followed; Lilly vs. Brown through 2005; Lilly vs. his 2006 Yankee equivalent, which in this case would we'll choose Jaret Wright, as he appears to be the least likely of the Yankees' top four that season to have been on the Yankees had they had Lilly; then Lilly vs. Igawa in 2007; Lilly vs. Darrell Rasner in 2008, as there's probably zero chance Rasner would've been on that team had they gotten 200-plus innings out of Lilly; Lilly vs. Sergio Mitre in 2009; and finally Lilly vs. Javier Vazquez in 2010, as it seems unlikely the team would've been compelled to trade for Home Run Javy had Lilly been on the staff.

This entire exercise of course requires quite a bit of imagination as well as a a blissfully ignorant acceptance of Michael Kay's beloved fallacy of the predetermined outcome, as obviously the events and personnel on the Yankees would have changed quite a bit if they had indeed wound up holding on to Lilly all these years. But for our purposes, we're just going to assume everything stayed the same, since it's impossible to construct every single possible scenario that could have played out involving Yankee teams of the last nine years.

You can click here to download the spreadsheet used to create these charts if you are so inclined.

Remember, even though it says "NYY ERA," etc., from 1999 through 2002 Pre-Trade the "NYY" numbers are Jeff Weaver's while on the Tigers. Interestingly, Weaver basically outperformed Lilly in every facet of the game in the three-and-a-half seasons prior to the 2002 trade, which I suppose supports why Brian Cashman acquired Weaver in the first place. Lilly was actually having a pretty solid 2002 for the Yanks (3.40 ERA, though a 4.25 FIP; however Lilly has outpitched his FIP in almost every season of his career due to higher-than-you'd like walk rates and something of a propensity for surrendering the long ball. He's been able to flourish in spite of this due to strand rates mostly in the mid-70% range and not allowing a BABIP above .300 since 2001. While we know BABIP fluctuates fairly wildly from year to year, nine straight seasons of sub-.300 BABIPs may be more indicative of a repeatable skill than luck), although Weaver was having an absurd campaign himself, flashing a 3.18 ERA/3.17 FIP and 3.3 fWAR -- a mighty impressive total given that the season was barely half over at the time of the trade (July 5).

Weaver would get the best of Lilly through the end of 2002 (1.1 fWAR to 0.1), as the latter spent part of the remainder of the season on the disabled list and when he wasn't injured, simply didn't pitch very well. However, the tables began to turn the following year, as Lilly would go on to post the strongest season of his career up to that point, while Weaver struggled mightily and was eventually more or less run of of town after posting a 5.99 ERA (though only a 4.26 FIP). Since then it's more or less been all Lilly compared to who the Yankees wound up using instead, with the exception of 2005, which was Lillly's worst season since his sophomore campaign and resulted in Kevin Brown actually out-fWARing him. In the eight-and-a-half seasons since the trade, Lilly has accumulated 21.9 fWAR compared to his Yankee counterparts' 11.0.

It becomes even more glaring when you look at what Lilly did over the duration of the four-year, $40 million deal he signed with the Cubs and that the Yankees were inexplicably so reluctant to dole out. Here are charts of the last four seasons of Yankee pitching staffs, and where Lilly would have ranked had he been on the team:

Lilly would have been the third-best pitcher on the 2007 and 2008 staffs, and believe it or not, the second-best pitcher on the 2009 World Champion staff. Lilly would've likely only have been the fourth-best starter among last season's group, but plugging him in to fill the spot vacated by Andy Pettitte would've essentially kept the well-oiled machine going instead of having to rely on Dustin Moseley, et. al.

Now one could make the case that perhaps Lilly's numbers wouldn't have ended up quite as shiny had he pitched these last four seasons in the AL East instead of the NL Central, but given Lilly's success in the American League, I don't think he would've performed too dramatically differently. Lilly ended up accumulating 12.5 fWAR during his four-year deal with the Cubs, while the Yankees mustered 0.9 fWAR out of what likely would've been Lilly's spot. Lilly ultimately provided the Cubs with $53.5 million of value -- a $13.5 million surplus. What do the Yankees have to show for Igawa? According to Fangraphs, he was so bad in 2007 he actually should've paid the Yankees $1.2 million for letting him "pitch," and the Yankees ultimately completely wasted $46 million that should've been allocated much, much differently.

While we'll never truly know why the Yankees decided to pass on a reunion with Lilly -- who reportedly wanted to come back to the Bronx, as his agent gave the Yankees a chance to match the Cubs' offer -- the decision to do so in the 2006-2007 offseason definitely ranks up there with some of the more baffling moves mad by the front office during the past decade.

The 2011 PECOTA Projections

2011-02-08T00:30:00.002-05:00

Baseball Prospectus released the first iteration of its 2011 PECOTA projections (the bane of Mike's existence) yesterday, and my initial impression is that they are quite a bit more favorable to the Yankees than the Marcels were (however, this is due in part to their being park-adjusted).

In particular, the Yankees' big bats -- Mark Teixeira, Alex Rodriguez and Robinson Cano -- each project a good deal more in line with what we'd expect their SLGs to look like. PECOTA has Tex at .275/.376/.510 (up from Marcel's .496 SLG); A-Rod at .273/.370/.517 (Marcel had his SLG at .486); and Cano's projected PECOTA line is .299/.347/.488 (Marcel: .476 SLG). It appears PECOTA has apparently done something of a turnaround on A-Rod; two years ago Nate Silver had A-Rod pegged for 27 home runs in 2011; today PECOTA has Alex projected to hit 34 home runs. Sign me up.

Yesterday Jason took a look at the numbers and posted his proposed lineup; the Yankee starters project to hit .269/.344/.452 -- in 2010 the team as a whole hit .267/.350/.436, and while I hate to see any drop in OBP, I could live with it if it meant more power. Oh, and Jesus Montero is projected to hit 18 home runs and SLG .471, which would be the fourth-highest mark on the team. Jesus saves, indeed.

On the pitching side of the ledger, Jay Jaffe does the legwork for us in a quick-and-dirty rundown of the contenders for the back end of the rotation, and notes that, much to everyone's chagrin, Sergio Mitre may actually not be the worst choice ever (at least among what the Yankees currently have available), while our man Hector Noesi and his pinpoint control also rates well. PECOTA really hates Ivan Nova, and while I'm willing to give him a shot to see if he can produce as a starter, noted prospect maven John Manuel sees Nova's future ultimately in the bullpen.

In fact, Manuel has a couple of interesting things to say about the Yankees' back-of-the-rotation prospects in that NoMaas interview:

SJK: Of the Yankees projectable, back-of-the-rotation arms (Hector Noesi, David Phelps, Ivan Nova, Adam Warren), who do you like the most? Do you think any of those guys could surprise us with a little more upside?

John Manuel: Noesi commands the fastball best of that group, followed by Warren. There's not a ton of difference between them, but Noesi's breaking ball, while fringy, is better than Warren's. If you're a back-of-the-rotation guy, you better throw strikes or you'll lose your spot in a hurry. That's what those two guys do. Phelps does it less, but his secondary pitches improved a bit last year. Nova always has had the best arm, we've been ranking him since he was in low Class A. Last year he threw harder, and with all the Yanks' offseason misses on pitchers, Nova has a good chance to earn a starting role in New York. I do not expect him to be a starter long-term because he has such power stuff and inconsistent control (not to mention command) that he fits better in the bullpen. I have to say overall I'm not a Phelps believer, but I've been wrong before.

Speaking of Warren, PECOTA apparently loves itself some Adam Warren, rather shockingly projecting 100.1 innings of 4.44 ERA ball with a 6.6 K/9, 3.4 BB/9 and 0.9 HR/9, worth 1.8 WARP. I say shockingly not as a knock on Warren's talent, but because he's never pitched above AA and only has 10 career starts at that level, though he did acquit himself nicely, throwing 54.1 innings of 3.15 ERA/2.56 FIP ball. I'm not entirely certain what to conclude from his projections, as they would make him the fourth-best starter (by WARP) on the Yankees right now. I'd be willing to totally write them off if not for the fact that CAIRO basically came to the same conclusion on Warren, with his 0.9 WAR (in 85 innings) the fourth-highest mark among Yankee starting pitchers. Oliver also seems to think fairly highly of Warren, projecting 122 innings of 4.47 ERA ball, worth 1.3 WAR.

A year ago Mike Axisa profiled Warren and concluded that "His stuff is firm and he’s as polished as they come, which is a great recipe for a quick mover and surefire big leaguer. Warren will never be an ace, but he’ll be a rock solid back-end arm or middle reliever that will provide a ton of value when he’s cheap. Believe it or not, the Yankees do a very good job of pumping out useful big league arms, and Warren is just another part coming down the assembly line." Based on these numbers it looks like Warren could have a shot at becoming something a little bit more than just another assembly line part.

Message to Yankee fans: Redirect the vitriol (a preemptive strike at crazy comments)

2011-02-07T15:59:00.000-05:00

Earlier today, Larry contemplated the unlikely possibility of a third reunion between Nick Johnson and the Yankees. Now I’m fairly certain that my pal is going to take some flack for this, so I’ve thrown together a quick ~~piece~~ rant imploring our readership to consider musings such as this objectively, before proceeding to tear my fellow writer a new one.

Anyway, the formula is simple:

Nick Johnson at a very discounted rate equates to inexpensive-quality OBP. Inexpensive-quality OBP outweighs both the potentiality of player frailty and feeble production of some of the current alternatives (i.e., Ramiro Pena).

Now, given our site’s emphasis on data-driven analytics, it’s easy to understand why we would endorse guys such as Johnson, or Javier Vazquez, or even, wait for it, Carl Pavano (part deux). If the numbers crunch and an organizational need is met, we typically buy in.

However, much of the New York fanbase is a tad more cynical (to put it kindly). Why bother with a guy like Johnson? He basically requires surgery every time he sneezes. Why bother with a guy like Vazquez, or Zack Greinke (even though he's not a free agent)? They can’t handle the exorbitant pressure inherent with the Bronx. Why bother with a guy like Carl Pavano? He’s less valuable than a [insert noun here].

See where I’m going with this? There’s always a vague explanation composed of intangible points proving why someone will inevitably flounder. And dammit, Brian Cashman (the root of all bad decisions) always seems to ignore all our passion-derived-predictively-accurate-angst, instead choosing the path of not-so-crafty-but-definitely-nonsensical-BS-free-agent-signing. Right? Right.

Here’s the plight. While the masses would explode if Carl resurfaced in pinstripes, the truth is he makes sense as a rotation solution to some degree. He’s simply better than the current options, and better players tend to produce better results. As much as I hated Pavano’s excuses for not playing the last time around, when I look at his numbers the past two seasons with the Twins I understand why he earned that second year from Minnesota’s front office. Maybe they’re that stupid/naive/foolish, etc., or perhaps good pitching options are, in actuality, quite thin these days. In other words, his skill set holds definitive value on the market to the extent that he was probably the best pitcher not named Cliff Lee who was available. Attach a pretend name to Carl's stats (such as Marl Savano) and he’s suddenly not so bad!

~~Consider~~ Focus on the stats. Put aside “grit” or “heart” or “clubhouse presence” and just look at the results. Now weigh one set of results against another; by dehumanizing the game just a tiny bit, we can develop a much greater appreciation for Cashman’s approach and responsibility as general manager.

We all know that New York’s greatest asset is their cash. A cheap alternative such as Nick Johnson -- who wouldn’t cost future draft picks or top prospects and is on a minor league incentive based deal -- means almost nothing to the organization. If Eric Chavez or Mark Prior flops this spring, who cares? Seriously. They’re cut and the team moves on to the next ~~scrub~~ one. If lightning in a bottle is to be found, the Yankees get a huge return on the investment -- such was the case with Marcus Thames.

Anyway, if you completely disagree with me, feel free to leave your two cents. I look forward to verbally jousting.

Whither Nick the Stick?

2011-02-07T14:01:00.001-05:00

Last offseason the statistically-obsessed among the Yankee faithful rejoiced upon the news that Brian Cashman had brought former Yankee farmhand, OBP machine and Yankeeist favorite Nick Johnson back into the fold. The Stick was supposed to fit seamlessly into Johnny Damon's recently vacated #2 slot, right where his .402 career on-base percentage belonged.

The injury-plagued Johnson muddled through an exceptionally poor April, though his .138/.383/.224 line was made significantly less miserable by (what else?) a stellar OBP, not to mention the fact that he also fell victim to some terribly bad luck on balls in play (.194 BABIP, 6th-worst in the AL that month). Just when it looked like the Stick was about to break out and assume his rightful role as an offensive force to be reckoned with (.286/.412/.643 in five May contests), he (surprise, surprise) was pulled from the lineup on May 7 against Boston, eventually had to have surgery that was initially expected to keep him out until the end of July, and of course, ultimately never made it back to the playing field in 2010. The Yankees easily declined the mutual option they held for Johnson on October 27, and the Stick hit free agency.

I opined back in November that Johnson might be useful as a bench piece were he willing to come back at a severely reduced salary, and given that we've heard barely a peep with regards to teams being interested in The Stick, he's still available and the fact that the Yankees are looking into upgrading their bench in any way shape or form (as evidenced by the Eric Chavez and Ronnie Belliard signings), I'd still endorse a Nick the Stick reunion. I know he can't field anywhere other than 1B, and therefore doesn't meet the team's needs for an extra glove, but still, it's impossible to ignore his on-base percentage projections.

Bill James projects Johnson at .264/.411/.427, .374 wOBA in 415 PAs; Marcel says .256/.384/.488, .346 wOBA in 306 PAs; CAIRO has .258/.394/.398, .360 wOBA in 301 PAs; Oliver calls for a .262/.394/.397, .361 wOBA line in 357 PAs; and PECOTA projects a .256/.404/.395 line in 450 PAs, which, as Steven R. from RAB noted, is PECOTA's second-highest OBP projection for all players in Major League Baseball. If you do a straight, unweighted average of those five OBP projections, you get .397. Injury issues and fielding limitations aside, whoever ends up signing Johnson is going to get quite an OBP bargain -- assuming he can stay on the field.

Given that Cash likely has Johnson's medicals permanently etched in his brain, I can only imagine he wants no part of a third go-round with the Stick, and Johnson's continued availability indicates that every other MLB team feels similarly. However, Johnson's lack of durability would not only make him an ideal buy-low candidate, but also dictates that his best use at this point in his career would be in a part-time role. I imagine he and his agent are still trying to sell his talents as a starting first baseman, but if they continue to get no interest at whatever salary level Johnson's looking for, maybe he'd be willing to bite the bullet, come back to the Yankees in a reduced role and actually provide some of the production the team thought it was getting in 2010.

One last word in defense of Brian Cashman

2011-02-07T08:15:00.121-05:00

I've gone on record several times backing Yankee General Manager Brian Cashman up this winter. While I certainly don't think he's perfect (I'm still not satisfied with the reasoning behind not giving Joba Chamberlain another chance in the rotation), and it's undoubtedly been an unexpectedly difficult offseason for Yankee fans, I still believe Cashman is the best man for the job and I think he's done everything within his power to improve the Yankees. Reader and friend of the blog Wayne, who I agree with on a good majority of Yankee-related issues, has made no secret of his disdain for Brian Cashman, and once again took Cash to task in the comment section of the Eric Chavez-Ronnie Belliard post. I started to respond to Wayne in the comments, but the response began taking on a life of its own and felt like it merited its own post.

I appreciate Wayne's fire as always, but I just can't get too rankled about a couple of non-roster invites to spring training. There's no harm in trying to see if either of these players has anything left to the point that they'd be more serviceable bench players than Ramiro Pena. It's not like Cash signed Chavez to contend to be the starting third baseman. And Justin Maxwell's nothing to write home about, but he's probably an upgrade over Greg Golson. Really, it's not like our 24th and 25th men are going to make or break the season.

Regarding Wayne's dissatisfaction with the lack of an apparent backup plan in the event that Cashman lost out on Cliff Lee, I'm willing to concede it's possible he misplayed those negotiations, but given Lee's apparent yearning to get back to Philly, I still don't know that things would have gone any differently had Cash come out with a CC Sabathia-style 7-year, $140M opening salvo at the beginning of November. I mean, perhaps if Cash had done something like that, then Ruben Amaro Jr. doesn't even think about trying to reacquire Lee. However, pretty much everything we heard from Lee's camp was that they didn't even want to field offers until the Winter Meetings. I have to imagine Cash at least made Lee aware of what the Yankees were willing to do financially back during that first trip to Arkansas on November 10, and I think it's pretty clear that Lee's stonewalling meant he'd give Philly as much time as it needed to put together a competitive offer. I suppose one could counter by saying the Yanks should've offered $180 million (and given how much heartburn we've all suffered as a result of the Lee spurning, this almost doesn't seem so crazy) but it's tough to blame the team for not wanting to give the richest contract in the history of the game to a 32-year-old pitcher who'd be near 40 by the time it ended. In the aftermath of what happened with Rafael Soriano, don’t you think ownership would’ve authorized Cash to go as high as it took to get Lee? That they stood firm tells me that at the end of the day, even the Yanks had a limit as to how far they were willing to go for a starting pitcher, even one as great as Lee is.

I am also willing to concede that perhaps Cash could’ve been a tad more aggressive at the outset of free agency, given the possibility that he’d miss Lee and the fact that Andy Pettitte appeared headed for retirement at the culmination of the 2010 ALCS. However, it's not as if the market was dripping with talent. Arguably the best starter available was Hiroki Kuroda, who wound up re-upping with the Dodgers for one year, $12 million on November 15 in what appears to have been a substantially below-market deal. Kuroda was actually the 17th-most valuable pitcher in the NL last season (4.2 fWAR), putting up a season worth $16.9 million. In 2010-2011 offseason dollars, he could've conceivably held out for a contract near $20 million. Of course, no one thinks Hiroki Kuroda is a $20 million/year pitcher, but it probably would've taken at least $15 million a year to get Kuroda away from LA -- and do you really want Brian Cashman to be giving a pitcher entering his age 36 season who has spent the last three years in the NL West $15 million a year?

The only other free agent pitchers even worth thinking about were Jake Westbrook, Jon Garland and Jorge de la Rosa, to whom I say no, no and hell no to, respectively. Had he made it to free agency I would've made a case for old friend Ted Lilly -- who I actually have a post scheduled about for tomorrow -- but the Dodgers re-signed him before the season even ended. Cashman literally had no chance to even go after Lilly.

Even after seemingly every name brand free agent pitcher came off the board there was still one name available, a pitcher who was the 11th-most valuable righthander in the American League last season, but a name who infantile Yankee fans couldn't stomach the idea that Cashman would even initiate talks with, despite the fact that his primary responsibility as GM of the Yankees is to make his team better. I can only imagine the anti-Cashman crew would've been apoplectic had Brian re-signed Carl Pavano, because, you know, adding a 3.2 fWAR pitcher to your rotation is terrible.

I admit, I was a tad disappointed that the Yankees seemingly missed out on Jeff Francis -- who seemed like he would've been a nice fit in the back end of the rotation, but (rightly) felt he'd have more of an opportunity in Kansas City -- and Justin Duchscherer, who might have been an even more enticing upgrade if management hadn't just gotten burned by Nick Johnson -- who I still believe was a highly worthwhile gamble last winter, but ask a member of the anti-Cash crew and they'll claim they knew Johnson was going to get injured all along.

Ultimately, I just don’t quite understand what the anti-Cashman contingent expects him to do. This has been perhaps the most unprecedented offseason in baseball history with regards to players leaving money on the table, from Lee, to Gil Meche to Pettitte. Cashman can’t force these players to come to New York. I think we Yankee fans need to take a step back sometimes and realize that just because a given baseball player is awesome or seems to make perfect sense to try to add to the roster, it does not mean that they automatically have to/want to come play for the Yankees. Brian Cashman does not have a mind-control device. It does not work that way.

For whatever Cashman’s faults may be as a team-builder, I don’t see how anyone can get on his ability to field a potent offense. No team in MLB has a higher wOBA (.351) over the last 10 seasons than the Yankees. Cash knows the Yankees’ bread-and-butter is patience and power, and those traits have been duly (and dually) reflected in the team’s stat ledger: Highest OBP in baseball since 2001 (.354), and second-highest slugging (.452, .001 points behind Boston’s .453).

Now on the flip side, Cashman’s White Whale to a certain extent has probably been pitching evaluation. Jeff Weaver, Kevin Brown, Jaret Wright, Carl Pavano, just to name a few (of course, it's not entirely clear how responsible Cash was for a number of these disappointments) of the pitchers that have been acquired on Cash's watch and have not lived up to expectations. However, since gaining full autonomy after the 2005 season, the Yankees went on to have one of their strongest drafts ever in 2006, and come 2009, the Yankees won their 27th championship with a rotation anchored by Cashman free agents Sabathia and A.J. Burnett, and a lights-out set-up man in Phil Hughes, the pitcher Cash refused to trade to the Twins for Johan Santana.

And ultimately, this is where I really get lost when it comes to Cashman-bashing. The team he assembled in 2009 wins it all, but somehow it doesn't count because Cashman did his "checkbook GM" thing and bought all the best players. Fast-forward two years later, and Cashman is still trying to purchase the best players money can buy, but their disinterest in coming to New York and/or deciding to retire -- despite the Yankees having the highest offer -- means Cash is a lousy GM and should have had a backup plan that somehow included the best free agent pitchers still being on the market after the Yankees missed out on Lee. If you want to believe that Cashman blew the Lee negotiations and should've been signing Kuroda, Garland and/or Westbrook in November while waiting on Lee, then I don't know what to tell you. I'm sure Lee would've felt really wanted if the Yankees went out and started filling out their rotation because they weren't 100% convinced they could get him.

I feel bad for the Yankee fans who think the team has a lousy GM; I really do. Can you imagine if your favorite team were run by Dayton Moore? Or Ed Wade? Or Kenny Williams? Or Omar Minaya? What's so bad about exercising a little restraint when Brian Cashman asks us to "be patient?" He cannot pull a rabbit out of a hat. People are upset that he's signing retreads like Freddy Garcia and Bartolo Colon to minor league deals, but who else is out there? These guys cost pennies on the dollar, and can be cut the moment they don't work out. Someone's gotta account for approximately 400 innings out of the back-end of the rotation. It's not as if Felix Hernandez or Jon Lester are available.

The Yankees have, for the first time in a long time, some very interesting possibilities down on the farm right now -- possibilities that could turn into legitimate Major Leaguers, or perhaps help acquire one if the right deal presented itself. But right now, that's all they are -- possibilities. For all the glowing reports we hear about a given Killer B, or how stacked the rotations are going to be at Trenton and Scranton, at the end of the day they're still all lottery tickets. That's what Brian Cashman is talking about when he's asking the fans to exercise patience. There are 29 other teams in Major League Baseball; no one is handing Cashman an experienced, valuable starting pitcher for free. The organization rightly needs to see what it has on its hands, and in the cases of the pitchers with the highest upside -- Manny Banuelos, Dellin Betances and Andrew Brackman -- that's likely going to take at least another year.

In any event, I'm sick of having to defend Brian Cashman. I wasn't intending this response to end up being a referendum on his offseason, but I guess that's what wound up happening, and it feels pretty good. This will also hopefully be the last time I am driven to defend Cash. I'm excited for spring training, excited as hell to see what the season holds for the Yankees, and excited to know that -- based on the information available to us -- Brian Cashman has done everything he can to make the Yankees as good as possible.

Top and Bottom Ten 2010 MLB starting pitcher horizontal and vertical pitch breaks by handedness and pitch type: The good, the bad and the average

2011-02-06T08:15:00.003-05:00

Data from JoeLefkowitz.com

As I've gotten deeper and deeper into pitching analysis of late, I recently realized that one of the aspects of pitching evaluation that I wanted to look further into but was having difficulty qualifying was horizontal and vertical pitch breaks.

While I've dabbled in horizontal and vertical pitch break analysis in the past, I realized that despite looking at the numbers, I still wasn't entirely clear on what constituted a "good" or "bad" amount of pitch break. Fortunately there are several prominent sabermetricians, including Mike Fast, Dave Allen, Josh Kalk and Sky Kalkman, who have done yeoman's work in helping amateur statisticians like myself in better understanding how to interpret PitchFX data. I'd also like to take a moment to thank SG of RLYW for providing feedback and guidance for this post.

For this particular post I wanted to acquire a data set that would ideally enable me to take a look at a pitcher's H-break and V-break for a given pitch on either an individual game or seasonal basis and be able to state with some confidence that said pitcher had "good," "bad" or "league average" H-break and/or V-break on said pitch. The end result is the table you see at the top of this post.

I wound up tallying the cumulative seasonal H-break and V-breaks for all of 239 pitchers that threw at least 10 innings as a starter, to ensure that the sample was large enough, binning them as righties or lefties, logging their 2010 Pitch Values per Fangraphs to see who had the best and worst pitches for each pitch type so I could rank the associated pitch break accordingly, and subsequently logging the average seasonal H-break and V-break for all 239 pitchers in the sample using Joe Lefkowitz's site.

As it turns out, I didn't have to spend the countless hours that I did compiling this data, as, had I looked just a little deeper, Fangraphs apparently carries individual PitchFX data for each big leaguer, and also enables you to toggle the league average for a given pitch's pitch break. I'm not entirely sure how I've been using Fangraphs on a daily basis for the last 18 months and somehow never managed to uncover this treasure trove of data, but it happened, I still ended up spending 30 hours creating a spreadsheet, and there's no way to undo all that time. If you are interested in reviewing my work, please click here to download the spreadsheet I created to tabulate all of the data for this post. (Note: Turns out TexasLeaguers.com carries an average pitch break table as well; although theirs tabulates every pitcher in MLB -- and includes postseason data -- whereas the one found at the top of this post if for starting pitchers only during the 2010 regular season).

Here are the H-break and V-breaks for the top and bottom 10 Fastball pitchers in MLB, per Fangraphs, which doesn't isolate Four-Seamers, Fastballs, Two-Seamers and Sinkers in its weighted pitch data but rather appears to utilize whichever fastball type a given pitcher throws the most (e.g., Tim Hudson's wFB value is for his sinker).

The Top 10 wFB pitchers threw Four-Seamers with an average H-break of -3.68 and V-break of 9.40. The MLB average of the 166 righties in the sample was -5.30 H-break and 8.60 V-break, while the Bottom 10 threw their four-seamers with an average -4.97 horizontal break and 8.51 vertical break. So the best righty fastball throwers in the game on average threw their Four-Seamers more than an inch-and-a-half closer to the plate and nearly an inch higher than the average MLB righthander. The discrepancy was actually slightly less pronounced between the Top 10 and Bottom 10 in H-break, and the V-break of the Bottom 10 was about 0.4 inches lower.

Interestingly, among the lefthanded Four-Seamer batch, the discrepancy between H-break for the Top 10, MLB average and Bottom 10 is almost nonexistent; however in terms of V-break the Top 10 threw their four-seamers nearly an inch higher than the MLB average. The top 10 lefties all have fairly comparable V-breaks on their Four-Seamers except C.J. Wilson, whose Four-Seamer broke nearly two inches lower than the rest of the pitchers in that chart. Wilson also threw his Four-Seamer less often than the other nine, and favored his Two-Seamer, which breaks more than two inches closer to the plate than the MLB average -- seven of the other 8 on the list with Two-Seamers actually broke further away from the plate than the MLB average.

I'm not going to dive too much deeper into the weeds on the three other fastball types, as there's already way too much data to digest and likely a decent amount of noise in the data set regarding the differentiations in pitch classifications, so feel free to draw your own conclusions.

Here's the data for Sliders:

There's minimal discrepancy among the H-breaks of the Top 10, average and Bottom 10 Sliders for both lefties and righties. For both hands the V-break is what differentiates the best Sliders from the average ones, and in both cases, less V-break appears to be more.

Here's the data for Cutters:

Again, not a tremendous difference between H-breaks for righthanded Cutters -- the vertical break is the big differentiator, as the Top Ten throw their Cutters an inch closer to the plate than the MLB average, while the Bottom Ten actually throw their Cutters almost two inches closer to the plate (obviously getting too much of it).

There's a bit more of a difference in reviewing the lefthanded Cutter, but there's also a significantly smaller sample size, as there simply aren't that many lefties that throw Cutters, so I'm not sure if the data is tremendously helpful. The top lefty Cutters average -1.44 H-break compared to the MLB average of 0.11, and 4.18 inches of V-break (exactly an inch closer to the plate than the MLB average).

Here's the data for Curveballs:

Here we finally have a pitch category featuring major variations in horizontal break. The average righty in 2010 threw a Curveball that broke 4.73 inches horizontally and -5.19 vertically. The Top 10 righty curveballs broke an inch-and-half further away from the plate (6.29) and about half-an-inch lower (-5.74). The worst Curveballs in the league only broke 3.67 inches off the plate horizontally and -4.69 inches vertically.

The Top 10 lefties saw their Curves also break significantly further than the MLB average, with -4.69 inches (compared to -3.16) of horizontal break and nearly -7 inches (against -5.45) of vertical break. Curiously, the Bottom 10 Curveballs were actually closer in break to the Top 10 than the MLB average Curves were -- clearly one of the reasons for the discrepancy in pitch value was velocity, as the average speed of the Top 10 was 75.4, while the Bottom 10 averaged 72.1.

And here's the data for Changeups:

The Top 10 righthanded Changeups averaged -6.93 inches of H-break compared to -6.66 for the average MLB righty, and 3.42 inches of vertical break, compared to 4.21 for the average. The worst changeups broke nearly an inch further away from the plate (-7.50) than the average, and were thrown about half-an-inch higher.

The Top 10 lefthanded Changeups saw almost no difference in H-break from the league average (7.86 to 7.80), but broke about half-an-inch less higher vertically (4.90 to 5.43). The least effective lefty Changeups curiously had nearly identical average breaks compared to the league average, and so I assumed the discrepancy would be due to a significant difference in velocity as was the case for the lefthanded Curveball. However, the Top 10 Curves averaged 82mph, while the bottom were 80.6, and so this is the one pitch type of the five we've discussed herein where the average breaks really aren't helping distinguish the best from the worst. Of course, if you examine each pitcher in the Top and Bottom 10 individually, you'll see a pretty dramatic difference between the pitch breaks of the good and bad curveball throwers and it would appear that the breaks between Top and Bottom pitchers are so erratic that they both managed to average out to unexpectedly similar figures.

In poring over this data, a few random non-pitch break observations couldn't help but pop out:
- Not that this is news, but James Shields, Scott Feldman and Brian Bannister had really terrible years. Bannister ranked below average in all four of his weighted pitch categories, and had the worst Cutter in the game. No wonder he's off to try to resuscitate his career in Japan. Hey, it worked for Colby Lewis.
- Ian Kennedy had the second-worst Slider among righthanders, but was in the Top Ten in both Curveballs and Changeups.
- Phil Hughes had the fifth-best Cutter among righthanders.
- C.J. Wilson had a fantastic year, appearing among the Top Ten lefthanders in wFB, wSL and wCT.
- Ted Lilly had a strange year. Despite having the eighth-worst negative delta between his ERA and FIP, he ended up recording the second-most-valuable lefthanded Fastball and 8th-best Cutter.
- Good news Brewers fans: Shaun Marcum's Changeup was the fifth-most valuable pitch among all pitches in this sample, behind only Tim Hudson's, Ubaldo Jimenez's, Trevor Cahill's and Cliff Lee's Fastballs. Felix Hernandez's Fastball rounded out the top six.

Anyway, if you are somehow still with me after all of this, to bring everything full circle, let's go back to those two posts I linked in the very first paragraph, one of which analyzed Cliff Lee's ALCS Game 3 start against the Yankees and the other looking at CC Sabathia's Game 5 start against the Rangers.

Here are Lee's and Sabathia's average pitch breaks from Game 3 and Game 5, respectively:

Now that I have the MLB averages, I can finally offer some additional analysis. The vertical break on Lee's Four-Seamer in ALCS Game 3 was out of control -- more than two inches higher than the league average lefthanded fastball, not to mention almost a full inch higher than his average Four-Seamer during the regular season. His Changeup was 1.5 inches further away from the plate than the MLB average and more than two inches higher. His Curveball was on another planet compared to the 2010 MLB lefthanded average, boasting -8.07 H-break and -9.49 V-break compared to -3.16 and -5.45; his Cutter completely bore in on righties, with -3.26 H-break (compared to the 0.11 MLB average); and his average Two-Seamer came in looking fairly hittable (7.83 H-break to 8.46 MLB average) but had way too much rise (10.14 V-break to 6.63 MLB average) to catch up to. So yes, the cumulative average MLB pitch break data confirms what we all knew: Cliff Lee's pitching was otherworldly that October night.

As for Sabathia, the break on his pitches wasn't quite as dramatic as Lee's, but he still significantly outperformed the league pitch break-wise with his Sinker, Changeup and Slider -- not coincidentally the three pitches that, according to Brooks, were the most effective per Linear Weights out of the five pitches Sabathia went to that night.

Anyway, there are several important caveats with all of this data -- (i) I realize that by including spot starters and pitchers who pitched significantly fewer innings than the primary starters for most teams that there could be some statistical bias in averaging the pitch breaks given the discrepancies in innings pitched, but I felt drawing from as large a sample as possible would ideally drown out most of the noise, and by including everyone that made a start the data set would be as close to a comprehensive compilation of average pitch breaks as one could find for all 2010 MLB starting pitchers.

(ii) As you can see, there are a few pitches I didn't bother with -- Screwballs, Forkballs, Eephus pitches, Knuckleballs and Knucklecurves were left out, since there simply aren't enough pitchers that throw them to draw any meaningful conclusions from averaging pitch breaks. I also left the Splitter out of this analysis -- even though Fangraphs carries wSF, there aren't enough pitchers that throw it to extrapolate meaningful conclusions. It also needs to be noted that Fangraphs' data and Lefkowitz's data, while pretty close, don't correspond perfectly. There are several instances whereby Fangraphs has weighted runs above average data for a specific pitch by a certain pitcher, but Lefkowitz doesn't have corresponding pitch break data for that pitcher having thrown said pitch.

(iii) And perhaps most important to keep in mind is that obviously every pitcher in baseball not only throws every pitch in their arsenal at different H- and V-breaks for every single pitch they throw, but at different speeds than everyone else does. And of course some pitchers also achieve later breaking action than others. Even if two random pitchers from a random distribution threw their fastballs at the same exact H-break and V-break, and one pitcher is among the best in the game and the other the worse, we have no idea whether either pitch will be considered "good" by looking solely at the pitch break -- other variables must factor in as well. In the Dave Allen articles linked below he assigns run values to a given pitch's H-break and V-break, which is massively insightful, although it's in graphical form which makes it difficult to review the actual numbers.

While I still have plenty more to learn about PitchFX data, and hopefully run values will soon be easily customizable, sortable and comparable to the league average on Fangraphs, my goal with this data was to at least provide some sort of benchmark or guideline so that when I look at a given pitcher's H-break and V-break data in a given game, I can at least try to get a sense of the level of effectiveness.

The following research was vital to compiling the information found in this post:
A PitchFX primer, by Mike Fast [Fast Balls]
The Breaking and the Knuckling: Run Value by Pitch Movement, by Dave Allen [The Baseball Analysts]
Fastball and changeup run value by movement, by Dave Allen [The Baseball Analysts]
Anatomy of a Player: League Average Pitcher, by Josh Kalk [The Hardball Times]
The Internet cried a little when you wrote that on it, by Mike Fast [The Hardball Times]
Understanding PitchFX graphs: Location and movement, by Sky Kalkman [Beyond the Boxscore]
PitchFX: Fangraphs' Sabermetric Library, by Steve Slowinski [Fangraphs]

Exploring some 2010 Yankee rate stats

2011-02-05T12:30:00.000-05:00

One of the great benefits of idling in a perpetual state of infinite boredom is that one has plenty of time to try and reengage his interests. At least, this is what I tell myself. Anyway, I thought it’d be entertaining to take a look at some various Yankees rate stats from the 2010 campaign and then contrast the team collectively with the rest of the American League.

Many of these percentages shouldn’t be entirely surprising as the team collectively posted some fairly robust offensive production. Still, some of the numbers do stand out. For example, in terms of HR% (percentage of all plate appearances a home run was hit), Alex Rodriguez posted the highest percentage on the team yet again. Stats like this help me digest the disgustingly lucrative contract he’s signed to and remember that a declining A-Rod is still desirable over the majority of Major Leaguers.

I wasn’t surprised to see Curtis Granderson vying for the inglorious title of New York “Strikeout King.” What did surprise me was that Jorge Posada was seriously competing for the position (even more so than Swisher). Over Posada’s 16-year career, he’s averaged a 20% strikeout rate which is a bit worse than league average over that time span (17%). Given how prolific Posada's been with the bat over the course of his career, that's pretty impressive (.275/.377/.479, .856 OPS).

My favorite part of this table involves XBH% (percent of all plate appearances ending with an extra base hit). A-Rod, Nick Swisher, and Robinson Cano all accumulated gaudy totals. To put the percents in perspective, consider some of the game’s offensive elite. Albert Pujols had a XBH% of 11.7%, Miguel Cabrera had a 13.0%, and Josh Hamilton had a 13.1%. If Jeter could somehow regain some of his magic and match his career norm (7.20%) in 2011, we’d really be in business.

IP% represents the balls-in-play percentage. Slap-happy Derek Jeter scores highest on this one (which makes sense given his propensity to hit into double plays). For those hoping for a repeat performance from Cano in 2011, the good news is his SO% has always been fairly low (career 11%) and he’s always managed a high IP% (80%). If Robby's plate discipline continues to improve (or even maintains status quo), the sky really is the limit for this kid.

As promised, here’s how the Bombers fared collectively against the rest of the American League. Despite that final month of lackluster play during the regular season, the Yankees still managed the best R/G in the American League (just beating out their AL East rivals, the Red Sox). Scoring 5.3 runs per game will go a long way in keeping you in the game. The good news is, the Yanks should be fairly close to that total once again in 2011.

Yankees sign Zombie Eric Chavez and Ronnie Belliard to minor league deals

2011-02-04T22:30:00.002-05:00

The Yankees have signed lifelong Athletic Eric Chavez and one-time All-Star Ronnie Belliard to minor league deals, per LoHud.

After peaking as the best third baseman in the American League in 2002, the injury-plagued Chavez enjoyed two more elite seasons before beginning his descent into mediocrity starting in 2005. Chavez hasn't appeared in more than 90 games since 2007, a season in which he managed a .322 wOBA and was worth 1.1 WAR. Since then he's essentially been a non-entity, and the primary memory I have of Eric of recent vintage is his breaking up Phil Hughes' no-hit bid in his second start of 2010 in Oakland.

Ronnie Belliard's had a fairly well-traveled career, and actually wOBAed .369 for the Nats in 96 games in 2008 -- more success than Chavez has had recently -- but was pretty wretched for the Dodgers last seasons, managing a pathetic .276 wOBA in 82 games.

Since you're here you're undoubtedly interested in their projections. Oliver thinks Chavez will wOBA .297 over 239 PAs, and be a detriment to the team, at -0.5 WAR. Oliver's slightly kinder to Belliard, projecting the infielder at a .312 wOBA over 378 PAs, worth 0.0 WAR. Marcel basically agrees, giving Chavez a .289 wOBA and Belliard a .319.

We also didn't get a chance to weigh in on Wednesday's Justin Maxwell-Adam Olbrychowski trade, although as others have noted, Maxwell's best-case scenario would essentially be serving as a more patient Greg Golson. Bill James oddly has Maxwell at a .336 wOBA over 144 PAs, Marcel .317 over 276 PAs and Oliver a Major League Equivalent .321 wOBA across 471 PAs. Those are actually decently respectable wOBA projections for a 5th outfielder, so perhaps Maxwell ends up playing some sort of small role on the 2011 squad.

Getting back to Chavez and Belliard, while I wouldn't expect either of these guys to produce anything, once again there's nothing wrong with shopping in the bargain bin on the chance something seemingly past its expiration date turns into a WAR surprise. Chavez is probably history, but Belliard could potentially be a serviceable backup infielder -- at the very least he should represent an upgrade over Ramiro Pena and his appalling .236 2010 wOBA.

Does Major League Baseball need a salary floor?

2011-02-04T14:30:00.000-05:00

At the end of a recent episode of HBO's Real Time, Bill Maher suggested that financial parity is the reason the NFL has become more popular than Major League Baseball. He didn't use those words precisely but he suggested that the reason football is more popular than baseball is because in football any team can win while in baseball only the rich teams can win.

Maher's obvious political metaphor aside, he was referring to the NFL's salary cap, its revenue sharing agreement and the perceived parity they contribute to the game. Was Maher's assertion correct? Does baseball need additional revenue sharing and a salary cap to reap the benefits of parity?

There are two components to this analysis. The first is the distribution of payrolls from the NFL. We can't project the impact of the successful NFL payroll policies onto baseball if those policies have been ineffective. The second component is the distribution of payrolls from MLB, to see if baseball lacks parity when compared to the NFL.

The graph below shows NFL payrolls by team, for 2008 and 2009, the most recent reliable data I could find. The data are sorted from largest payroll to lowest payroll for 2009, with the 2008 data presented for comparison. USA Today is the data source.

There is a strong suggestion of parity there, but the graph alone won't tell the whole story. To make some sense of it, see the chart below, which contains some basic measures of comparing the maximum and minimum payrolls in the NFL.

At first glance there isn't all that much parity there. In either season there is an obvious high team and the difference between the highest and lowest paid teams is a wealthy NHL team. If there is an accurate measure of parity, it would be the proportion of the median NFL salary to the maximum NFL salary, because this is a scaled measure of the difference between the middle payroll level and the team with the highest payroll in either season. That number is just a hair above 80%, which suggests some degree of parity. The real question is whether or not these ranges differ significantly from the payrolls in MLB.

The graph below is identical to the one provided for the NFL, except it has data for MLB teams for 2011, 2010 and 2009. The graph is ordered by the 2011 salary data, which are estimated and come from Baseball Reference. The 2010 and 2009 data came from Ask.com.

As before, the graph is important, but the real story will come from the measures that compare maximum, average and minimum salaries, which are posted below.

Comparing the two tables tells a lot. Obviously baseball has some outliers at the high end of its payroll scale, but the difference isn't all that extreme between the 2008 NFL high salary and any of the Yankee payrolls (come on, we all know who the prime offenders are here) from the past three seasons. The real story comes at the bottom end of the data, not the top. Despite having several teams each season with a higher payroll than the highest in the NFL, MLB has a lower median and average salary than the NFL each season. That outcome is surprising. If baseball's problem is its heavy spenders (the Yankees, Red Sox and Phillies, etc.) then its average salaries should skew upward when compared to the NFL. Instead, they skew downward, suggesting the lack of parity isn't due to the big spenders. It's due to the cheapskates.

The minimum salary in the NFL in 2009 was $81.8 million. That was higher than the median salary in baseball the same season. Fifteen teams in baseball had payrolls below the lowest NFL payroll that year. That same season 10 teams had payrolls below $70 million, almost the equal to the nine teams that had payrolls above $100 million in 2009. Can we still be so certain that baseball's problem is the high end of the payroll distribution? It looks as if it has at least as much of a problem at the bottom. Salary cap defenders will be quick to argue that the NFL has revenue-sharing, which helps its poorer teams compete with the wealthier ones, but that's a cop-out. MLB has revenue-sharing as well.

Maher was no different in his analysis than virtually all of the other sports' prognosticators who criticize baseball's lack of a salary cap. He left out a component of the sport's parity that is just as important, if not more important than its salary cap and revenue sharing program. The NFL has a salary floor as well, set to 75% of its salary cap in any given season. This aspect of the NFL's pay structure is almost never mentioned when baseball is criticized for lacking a salary cap. The Pirates and the Royals can't exist in the NFL because instead of pocketing their revenue-sharing dollars those teams would be forced to reinvest a large chunk of that money into their on-field products. Did I mention those two teams are profitable? Yet there are still those that think the Yankees are what's wrong with baseball.

These data suggest that a salary cap may be a useful tool to introduce more payroll parity in baseball (which I have not argued the sport needs -- that's another post) but it wouldn't be just to start there. Unlike football, baseball revenues are heavily localized. The Yankees' main revenue generator is the YES Network, not the money it gets from a TV deal with Fox. The network is a Yankee asset that the team built up to meet demand in its market, not a potentially shared resource the way a national TV network would be.

Why punish an organization that chooses to use its resources to put a better product on the field, especially when the on-the-field product helps every team in baseball? If baseball wants more payroll parity, the way the NFL has, the teams at the bottom of the payroll distribution are more obvious targets. If baseball had a salary floor, just like the NFL has, then teams like the Pirates and Royals would have to invest in their product, which in turn would attract more fans. If, after that, baseball fans not in the New York and Boston areas still scream for a salary cap, then maybe they have an argument, but they don't right now, not when the league has revenue-sharing and allows its cheapest spenders to pocket that money.

The 2011 Marcel Projections

2011-02-04T08:15:00.001-05:00

Tango's 2011 Marcel projections are here! Only, if you're a Yankee fan, they may make you want to crawl into a deep, dark hole somewhere.

Thus far this offseason we've been treated to three projection systems: Bill James' came out first, and as per usual they were considerably optimistic; SG released the first iteration of his CAIRO projections shortly thereafter, and they seemed far more realistic; and I bought The Hardball Times' Oliver forecasts for the first time and found them to be terribly pessimistic. I also recently pre-purchased the 2011 Baseball Prospectus Annual, so the PECOTA projections will be coming later this month, and Dan Szymborski's ZiPS should also be coming out soon, and as far as I know these account for the major projection systems. For now we have Tom Tango's Marcel, which is slightly kinder to the Yankees than Oliver, but not by much.

First, the offense:

Marcel has Derek Jeter with a slight uptick in each triple-slash, but an overall uninspiring .334 wOBA. Poor Nick Swisher -- this is the fourth out of four systems that doesn't believe in his last two years. I guess that awful 2008 is still too fresh of a wound for the various algorithms. Same goes with Robinson Cano -- after two straight seasons of .370-plus wOBA production, Marcel sees him falling all the way from .389 to .354. Once again 2008 seems to be rearing its ugly head. Mark Teixeira's projected for a small increase, but it seems ludicrous that Tex wouldn't be able to at least crack .380 again. As we all recall, Tex's numbers took a huge hit during his massively injury-plagued last six weeks of the season. A healthy Tex that defies the odds and gets off to a good start in 2011 should end up blowing well past a .374 wOBA.

Both Oliver and Marcel seem to think Alex Rodriguez will be a .360s-wOBA hitter again, to which I say "bah," and also "I certainly hope not." Jorge Posada is unsurprisingly being projected to fall off considerably due to age, but I can't see Jorgie falling to a .340 OBP -- even if he loses some pop, he should still get his walks. Curtis Granderson's still got a lot to prove, at least according to Marcel, while the system is also not much of a fan of a Russell Martin comeback. Something tells me if Martin is struggling to wOBA even .320 through the first two months of the season Jesus Montero will be boarding a Bronx-bound train rather quickly. Speaking of Montero, Marcel unfortunately doesn't have a projection for our savior. And Brett Gardner is the third Yankee in the starting lineup to be projected at a .341 wOBA.

Put it all together, and this Marcel-projected 2011 Yankee lineup projects to score 5.26 runs per game. The team as a whole scored 5.3 runs per game last season, so this doesn't seem like a terrible projection, but we're also not including the bench, which is probably going to be pretty bad. Of course, if Montero comes up and Andruw Jones can be Marcus Thames circa last season, then the offense should get a little boost. Additionally, these projections almost unilaterally feel like worst-case scenarios, perhaps with the exception of Jeter. I won't be sold that he's not cooked until they actually start playing games again.

Here's the pitching staff:

CC Sabathia and Phil Hughes are right around where you'd expect them -- every projection system thinks the Franchise will improve upon his 2010, so that's comforting. Marcel has him cutting his HR/9 by 0.19; if he can get it closer to 1.00 we'd have quite the #2 starter on our hands. Marcel sees improvement for A.J. Burnett, but it's still nothing to write home about. This is the second straight system (after Oliver) that loves it some Ivan Nova. However, Marcel's projections are for Nova at 71 innings, so they're pretty worthless as far as trying to predict how he'd do as a starter. Sergio Mitre's numbers also look crazy, except Marcel only has the MeatMan throwing 66 innings. Freddy Garcia's projections are over 144 innings, while Bartolo Colon's numbers are over 66 frames. Neither set of numbers is particularly inspiring, but Garcia's at least lend some credence to him potentially being a serviceable 5th starter.

Nothing terribly surprising in the bullpen, although Marcel thinks every reliever's HR/9 is due for a slight uptick. Marcel is also not much of a fan of Joba Chamberlain, and sees his FIP going up by 0.74 points. Rafael Soriano looks to be about where you'd expect, and Mariano Rivera projects to be very good, but Mo pretty much outperforms his projections every year so I wouldn't put much stock in his numbers. David Robertson and Boone Logan's numbers seem about right, although Marcel sees them losing strikeouts and also walking less batter. Marcel also has Pedro Feliciano walking less men, but the inevitable correction in his absurdly low HR/9 from 2010 will balloon his FIP.

All in all it's not the prettiest picture in the world, but I expect the offense to perform better than these projections would indicate. On the pitching side, unfortunately these projections are not particularly useful for trying to fill the back end of the Yankee rotation in, but if you try to extrapolate the numbers out over a full season in the rotation, I'd imagine Nova still looks superior to the other three. Unfortunately one of that unfortunate triumvirate may be stepping in right behind Nova.

ETA, 8:42am: Moshe pointed out that the Marcel projections are ballpark-independent. I gather that means we can expect a slight uptick in the offensive numbers given the Yankee Stadium effect, but I don't know specifically by how much. I'm surmising by perhaps .005 to .010 points of wOBA, which Moshe more or less agreed with, while also noting that the adjustment could be higher for power lefties.

What Andy Pettitte's retirement means for the Yankee rotation

2011-02-03T15:51:00.002-05:00

There is no way around the fact that Andy Pettitte deciding to hang his spikes up is highly disappointing. I was convinced he'd return, with seemingly plenty left in the tank, a chance to climb up the all-time leaderboards and perhaps an opportunity for another championship (although admittedly even my optimism slowly began to drain when we still hadn't heard anything three weeks after that mid-January post). Apparently the draw of sitting around on piles of cash doing nothing every day was just too compelling for Andy to subject his body to the rigors of another Major League Baseball season.

And so The Show must go on. Considering that at the outset of the offseason I expected (as did pretty much everyone else) the Yankees to be carrying both Cliff Lee and Andy Pettitte in their 2011 rotation, it's time to reassess expectations. Maybe I'm crazy and seeing the world through rose-colored glasses, but I remain convinced that the Yankees will be good in 2011, and should still have enough firepower to compete for the division. And even if they're not all that good, at the very least they should be a tad more interesting to watch than they've been in the past.

For pretty much every season over the last decade I've sat down at the beginning of every Yankee game expecting them to win each and every time out. Even though we know they're typically going to lose around 62-72 times a season, unless they're facing a lefthander with a sub-90mph fastball, I've always felt great about the team's chances of winning any given game. With less certainty in the rotation than they've had in some time, maybe I won't lose my mind every time the starter blows up early and puts the Yankees in a huge hole, or the offense decides to take the night off, or the bullpen blows a lead, because I won't be expecting them to win every game.

Ah, who am I kidding, that's a bunch of garbage. I live and die with every pitch; I'm sure I'll still take every run surrendered and every loss just as hard as I always do.

But what hopefully will be compelling is seeing what some of the team's much-heralded rookies, who we've spent a lot of time talking about this winter, can do. It sounds like Freddy Garcia may have the upper hand for one of the final two spots in the rotation primarily based on his mediocre-but-better-than-every-other-candidate's 2010 results, and most expect Ivan Nova to slot somewhere in the back end as well. But a lot can happen between now and the beginning of the season. I don't have a particular problem if Brian Cashman decides to go out and sign a Kevin Millwood or whoever to a minor league deal, but at this point I don't think they necessarily need to. While more competition down in Tampa could spur some of the younger players on, if Garcia/Millwood/whoever ends up taking valuable Major League development time away from a talented youngster, that could end up being counterproductive. I'd like to see David Phelps, Ryan Pope, D.J. Mitchell or Adam Warren make cases for themselves during the Spring. Maybe Hector Noesi steps up.

One thing we do know is that it's probably unlikely that we'll see any of the B's this season. For as much hype as Manny Banuelos and Dellin Betances have received of late, we have to remember that they have a collective six Double A starts between them. That's not to say it's impossible, but I imagine the Yankees would prefer to see what some of their slightly less-heralded pitching prospects that are a little further along in the development pipeline can do before they rush two of the more highly touted pitchers they've had in a few years to the Majors.

Regardless, 2011 is shaping up to be one of the more fascinating Yankee seasons in some time by virtue of the fact that we really have no idea what to expect out of the pitching staff. CC Sabathia should be amazing again; Phil Hughes will hopefully build on a promising 2010; and A.J. Burnett really can't be any worse than he was last year. But after those three, it's anyone's guess. As a not-so-wise man has said many times over, "You can't predict baseball." For arguably the first time ever, Mr. Sterling, your favorite phrase may actually carry some water.

A fond farewell to Andy Pettitte

2011-02-03T14:20:00.008-05:00

As the brilliant Washington Irving once explained, “Sweet is the memory of distant friends! Like the mellow rays of the departing sun, it falls tenderly, yet sadly, on the heart.” Boy, do those words ring true as the stark reality of Andy Pettitte’s pending departure from baseball echo throughout our minds.

In terms of pitching, Pettitte was nothing short of ideal. As Larry noted in his recent tribute, Andy has worked his way into the Hall of Fame discussion through consistent quality production, gathering hoards of dedicated fans all the while. However, I have always felt it was Andy’s unassuming way of going about his business that truly distinguished him from many of the other great players to don pinstripes. His modest disposition and professional work ethic always impressed me personally, and his perceived humility allowed many of us to look past prior transgressions.

For many in Yankeeland, Andy's retirement also signals the beginning of a very surreal circumstance; that is to say, the first of four incredible careers which defined a generation of fandom has abrubtly come to an end. While the future impact of these iconic players absconding from baseball remains obscure to me, I can absolutely say that it was a supreme delight watching their careers unfold over these many, many years. And it is only through bittersweet passion of the sport that many of us are able to critique their respective declining years while simultaneously upholding strong degrees of sentimentality.

Although the Yankee organization will surely miss Andy, especially given the tumultuous state of the rotation, his retirement should still be reflected upon with happiness and appreciation. He’s accumulated generational wealth and deserves the opportunity to enjoy the next stage of his life regardless of whether or not we as fans are ready to let him go. While many will be quick to mention his capacity for continued competitive performance, or the fact that an abundance of cash could still be acquired, the truth is fairly simple and straightforward -- he’s ready for something new, and the reasons for choosing this path are his alone.

And so, I leave you with one final word of wisdom compliments of Dr. Seuss. “Don't cry because it's over. Smile because it happened.”

[Update: 2/3/11 3:06PM] Be sure to check out this excellent photo montage of memorable Pettitte moments.

BREAKING: Andy Pettitte to retire

2011-02-03T12:35:00.003-05:00

Multiple sources are reporting Andy Pettitte will announce his retirement tomorrow. This is a rather unexpected blow -- though it can't exactly be considered surprising -- and there's certainly no sugarcoating it.

We'll have more later; for now the only upside is hopefully getting to see some of what the Yankees have down in the farm system perform well at the MLB level this coming season.

In case you missed it, we did something of a tribute to Andy the other day, which is unfortunately rather appropriate now.

If CC were to opt-out next season, how much could he get?

2011-02-03T08:17:00.001-05:00

In his post on Monday about Yu Darvish, Larry made an important point about CC Sabathia, one I'd like to re-emphasize here: The big lefty is the best player on the Yankees.

In 2009, a swath of players were in competition for that title (which is a big reason why the club won the World Series). In 2010, Alex Rodriguez, Derek Jeter and Mark Teixeira all saw their numbers decline to varying degrees. When asked to name the best player on the Bombers in 2010, most fans would have argued Robinson Cano, but no one would push back against the suggestion that the best player was actually Sabathia, given his importance as the team's Ace. Furthermore, he has been the best Yankee over the past two seasons, every bit as good in pinstripes as he was advertised as being before the team made him the richest pitcher in baseball.

Cliff Lee is two years older than Sabathia and has spent more time on the DL during his career than CC. He just signed a five-year, $120 million deal. In the process he got the Yankees to make him a variety of contract offers, some rumored to be as long as seven years at $23 million per year. Given that the Yankees just showed their hand to an older, less durable pitcher, why, exactly, won't CC exercise his opt-out clause at season's end to get an additional $30-$40 million from the Yankees?

Sabathia has told anyone who will listen that he is happy in New York and will not opt-out of his contract, but how serious can he be? Sabathia will be paid an astounding $97 million over the last four years of his current deal. That's a lot of money for him to gamble with, but he knows what a pitcher of his caliber is worth to the Yankees. At the end of 2011 he will still be younger than Lee was during his free-agency bonanza, when his smallest contract offers from the Yankees were for five years and $125 million. If Sabathia pitches as well in 2011 as he did in 2009 and 2010 he will be in a position to earn himself an additional $40 million or so, on top of the $97 million that he is currently guaranteed, if he opts-out. That's why I expect him to do it. When was the last time you turned your back on $40, let alone $40 million?

CC's free-agency price tag would have little to do with his baseball performance, and more to do with Yankee desperation. The team would simply not be in a position to let him walk. Even if Sabathia has a down year he would still likely find himself in a position to extort an additional $10 million from the Yankees, but market economics aside, how much could CC command based on the value of his performance alone?

In a world that excluded Yankee desperation as an input into the size of Sabathia's new contract (that input being worth about $789 million -- give or take -- as far as I can tell), two factors would influence the size of the deal: (1) Sabathia's perceived longevity and (2) Sabathia's recent value.

Sabathia is believed to have the potential for incredible longevity, both within a season and from season-to-season. He has never pitched fewer than 180.1 innings in a season in his entire career. He hasn't pitched fewer than 190 innings since 2004. Over the past four seasons the big-man has pitched 241.0, 253.0, 230 and 237.2 innings respectively.

Sabathia has proven himself to be as big an innings eater from year-to-year as there is in all of baseball. That kind of durability means that even in a bad season (for him) he'd probably be worth at least $10 million. He could have a dud year or two over the lifetime of a seven-year contract and still be more likely than most pitchers to earn his paycheck on the strength of his up years.

Some alarmists may point to Sabathia's weight to argue that he is more of an injury risk moving forward than his statistics suggest, but it is hard to ignore his track record. Despite the weight, CC has gone his entire career without any major injury. In order for CC not to pitch for another six or seven years his injury pattern would have to change dramatically.

In addition to nailing the longevity input of the big contract, Sabathia also hits a home run on the value side of the equation. Sabathia has become somewhat of a different pitcher with the Yankees, relying more on his slider and changeup to induce groundball outs in exchange for the strikeouts he relied upon before joining the Bombers. As a result, it makes the most sense to project his future value against the value he has demonstrated the past two seasons.

That projected value is tremendous. In 2009, Sabathia was worth $28.4 million and in 2010 he was worth $20.4 million, according to Fangraphs (CC's 2010 was almost identical to his 2009. This translated to slightly less value given the improvement in pitching throughout baseball in 2010.) That suggests an average-annual-value of a new contract of at least $24 million. Furthermore, expanding the analysis out further actually raises the annual salary Sabathia could command. In 2007 he was worth $28.9 million and in 2008 he was worth $34.4 million.

Taken together this confirms that CC Sabathia could easily command an annual salary of $25 million for five to seven years, if he were to opt out of his current deal with the Yankees. He doesn't even need to match his exceptional performance from recent seasons to earn such a contract in 2011.

He is so important to the Yankees, and has established so dominant a track record, that he need only avoid injury while pitching to a 115 or so ERA+ in 2011 to demand a five-year, $125 million deal. If he laces 'em up this coming season and once again busts out a 135 to 140 ERA+ season the way he has done the past few years, while accumulating 225+ innings over 34 starts then he would find himself in a position to demand a blank check from the Yankees. Under those circumstances not even a seven-year, $175 million deal would be out of the question.

I love everything about CC. I love his performance. I love his attitude. He wants the ball in big situations, and delivers when he gets it. He's a leader in the clubhouse. For these reasons I believe him more than I would any other player when he says that he has no intention of opting out of his contract at the end of the 2011 season. Only when I run the numbers I find myself second-guessing the big guy's honesty. It's not that athletes never leave money on the table; it's that athletes seldom leave a potential $30 to $80 million on the table. Prove me wrong CC. Prove me wrong.

What to expect from Hector Noesi and Ivan Nova in 2011

2011-02-02T08:15:00.011-05:00

Two names that Yankee fans could be finding themselves increasingly familiar with this coming season are Ivan Nova and Hector Noesi. The Yankee faithful bore witness to the former's indoctrination to The Show last fall in the form of seven so-so starts that typically featured Nova mostly shutting the opposing team down the first two times through the order (.554 OPS the first time through the order and .713 the second time through) before pretty much imploding around the time he faced his 19th hitter and beyond (opponents throttled Nova to the tune of an appalling .400/.531(!)/.480 triple slash the third time through the order). As of now, Nova is expected to occupy the 4th or 5th starter's slot (hopefully the latter) when the season begins, but he'll also likely have some competition this spring.

Names like Adam Warren and David Phelps have been thrown around a lot this offseason, although from what I've read it sounds like Noesi may be next in the pecking order with regards to getting a shot to show what he has at the Major League level.

Here's a look at what Nova and Noesi have done thus far in their young careers:

The biggest plus in Noesi's game is that he apparently doesn't walk anybody. Noesi has also racked up his share of strikeouts during his time on the farm. According to Mike Axisa's prospect profile, Noesi's best pitches are his fastball and changeup (be great to see a pitcher from the Yankee system finally come up and throw a halfway decent change after seeing the Yankee offense get stymied by offspeed slop time and time again), while Sean at TYU also notes Noesi's curveball. Barring an outrageous spring, Noesi will almost certainly start the year back in AAA, but if he continues to pitch well we may see him in the Bronx in the 'pen -- or possibly even as a spot starter -- sometime this summer.

As for Nova, E.J. Fagan has a great scouting report here, and concludes that if Nova can get through six innings a game (though this remains a big if, at least for me) and can put up an ERA between 4.40 and 4.70 he'd be valuable in the back end of the rotation. I mostly agree, although if Nova can't keep his ERA under 4.50 in the Majors I'd have to think the Yankees will try to find someone in the system who can. TYU's Steve S. also recently took an informative look at Nova, and ponders whether he could potentially reinvent himself as a Chien-Ming Wang-style sinkerballer. That would certainly be a best-case scenario for Nova and the Yankees, and as Steve notes, the vertical break on Nova's fastball per Fangraphs was +6.7, which compares somewhat favorably to Wang's 5.4 for his career.

As far as projections go, Bill James sees a 4.61 ERA/4.22 FIP over 80.0 innings for Nova. CAIRO is a good deal harsher on Nova, projecting a 5.21 ERA/5.03 FIP over 116 innings, worth 0.5 WAR. And Oliver is decidedly bullish on Nova, projecting a 4.25 ERA over 166 innings (5.9 K/9, 3.4 BB/9), worth 2.2 WAR. I think we'd all do cartwheels if Nova managed to break the 2.0 WAR barrier.

CAIRO is slightly less tough on Noesi, with a 5.08 ERA/4.91 FIP in 80 innings worth 0.4 WAR, while Oliver thinks Noesi will pitch to the same exact ERA as Nova but do so in less innings (113) and get there in a slightly different fashion (7.2 K/9, 1.8 BB/9), in a season worth 1.5 WAR.

Nova clearly has a jump on Noesi as far as experience goes, but Noesi's actually posted stronger peripherals than Nova at A+, AA and AAA, albeit in considerably smaller sample sizes. Still, Noesi's high strikeout totals and significantly lower walk rates (since graduating from Rookie ball Nova has never posted a BB/9 less than 2.78, and that was in high A, while Noesi hasn't had a BB/9 above 2.00 since graduating from low A) could bode well for Hector as he tries to establish himself as a Major League pitcher.