A new era

To our wonderful readership base:

We are incredibly pleased to announce that Yankeeist has decided to merge with our good friends and like-minded analytical seamheads at The Yankee U to create a brand-new one-stop shop for all of your statistically-driven Yankee blogging needs:

The Yankee Analysts

Aside from having to adjust your bookmarks to reflect our shiny new URL, this changes absolutely nothing regarding the hard-hitting, deep analytical content you've come to know and love from the Yankeeist team. Mike, Matt and I will continue to write at as a feverish a pace as we can, only now you'll have more reasons to keep coming back over and over and over, as our expanded writing staff will be posting new Yankee content all throughout the day, every single day of the week.

Needless to say, we are very excited to be teaming up with our pals at TYU, who you likely already read every day anyway, and combining our efforts will result in an end product unlike anything else in the Yankee blogosphere.

So once again, please join us immediately at our new blogging home, The Yankee Analysts. We'll keep Yankeeist up in case one of us has something to share that doesn't necessarily make sense at TYA, but TYA is our new HQ.

We'd like to take a moment to thank each and every one of you who have made Yankeeist a part of your daily routine -- you are the reason Yankeeist is what it is today -- and we look forward to seeing you over at our new digs. If you have any comments or questions, feel free to leave them in this thread, or preferably at the new site, or e-mail me at Yankeeist at Gmail dot com.

Yankeeist Live Chat | February 11, 2011

Yankeeist Chat Reminder | TODAY (Friday February 11, 2011)

Be sure to join Mike and me for the first 2011 Yankeeist Live Chat this afternoon (Friday February 11, at 3:00 PM EST). There's a lot going on in Yankeeland (state of the rotation, bench depth, bullpen additions, Brian Cashman, etc.) and we can certainly hit on all of them.

I look forward to seeing you there!

Just say (Liria)no

I may be in the minority, but I'm just not terribly excited by the prospect of the Yankees potentially trading for Francisco Liriano, which is why I hadn't bothered to comment on it. But given the number of smart people taking serious looks at it, it seemed worth weighing in on.

Liriano had an unequivocally spectacular year in 2010. 6.0 fWAR (4th-highest total in the AL in 2010) seasons for pitchers don't exactly grow on trees, nor do 2.66 FIPs over 191.2 innings. Pretty much everything went right for Liriano in 2010: spectacular K/9 (9.44), low-ish BB/9 (2.72), nearly nonexistent HR/9 (0.42) and a superb GB% (53.6%). His season likely would've been one for the ages had he not surrendered a .331 BABIP -- a mark around the 10th percentile, and by far the worst mark of the top ten AL fWAR pitchers -- and been able to strand runners slightly more effectively than 1.1 basis points above average (73.1%), numbers that led to Liriano not only significantly outpitching his 3.62 ERA, but recording the highest positive delta between his ERA and FIP in the AL.

I cite all of this ostensibly to say "let's see it again." We know Liriano can be a great pitcher, but he's really only done it twice -- in 2006 (before injuries derailed him for about two-and-a-half seasons) and last season. There's certainly a lot to like about the idea of a 27-year-old lefthanded near-ace pitching for the Yankees (and again, I'm applying the "near-ace" tag solely because I don't think Liriano's done it long enough to be considered a true number-one) who also had the best slider in the American League in 2010. There's also some concern, regarding whether or not he can stay healthy enough to repeat his elite 2010, along with the fact that he's only under team control for two more seasons.

If this were a Matt Garza situation where you had three more years of team control, maybe you start thinking about unloading some of your top talent. But for all of Liriano's excellence, I can't fathom giving up a bat the likes of which the Yankee farm system has in all likelihood never produced during many of our lifetimes, and I'm be highly reluctant to part with any of the B's, despite the fact that we have no idea whether any of them will end up panning out.

If I'm the Yankees, I sit this one out, unless the asking price drops from Jesus Montero and Manny Banuelos to a package of second-tier prospects. Hey, the Mets were able to extract Johan Santana for yesterday's garbage, so stranger things have certainly happened. However, you know Bill Smith will ask for the sun, the moon and the stars from the Yanks given that they're both in the AL, not to mention the fact that the Yankees have likely come to symbolize quite a bit of frustration on the part of Twins' fans. Smith would really have to be blown away to trade the team's best pitcher to the Yankees. At the end of the day the Yankees need to pass and wait until the end of the 2012 season, at which point we'll know if Liriano's still the goods, and if so, the team can make as lavish an offer as they see fit without surrendering prospects.

Is there any chance Bartolo Colon has something left in the tank?

During his playing days I routinely called Bartolo Colon "Big Fat Bartolo Colon" and Krispy Kreme. Despite this, I was indifferent when the Yankees signed him to a minor league contract this offseason for reasons my co-author Matt Warden voiced best. The Yankees have money to burn, this year especially. The cost of one minor league contract is, literally, nothing to the team. Once upon a time Krispy Kreme was a good pitcher. Given that his contract is worth about $0 to the Bombers, he represents nothing but upside. If it turns out he has something left in that voluminous gut of his then the Yankees win. If not, no one loses. With that in mind, Larry suggested we investigate whether or not the numbers suggest Colon has anything left to offer the Yankees in 2011.

The data below are taken from Baseball-Reference and Fangraphs. I've captured everything Colon has done in the majors since 2002 through 2009, the last time he pitched in the big leagues.

That table isn't very encouraging. Krispy's career stats show that once upon a time he was a reliable pitcher. Unfortunately, that appears to be based largely on what he did from 1998 to 2005. After being a reliable innings eater year-in-year-out, Colon hasn't pitched more than 100 innings since 2005 and hasn't come close since 2007. After missing all of 2010, it seems unlikely that Bartolo will be able to make the team this season, let alone give the Yankees much in the way of durability.

Digging a bit deeper, it appears that Colon also became inconsistent beginning in the 2004 season. After never posting an ERA above 4.09 since he had become a frontline starter, Colon saw his ERA bloat to 5.01 in 2004, his first subpar full season in the majors. After that, apart from his 2005 campaign, his WHIP elevated permanently, and his ERA and FIP bounced around from being good in some seasons to bad in others. The combined picture is one of a player who has a fork sticking out of his back, not one who is primed for a comeback.

Once upon a time Big Fat Bartolo Colon was a good pitcher. He broke into the majors with the Indians in 1997 and settled into their rotation. He also peaked with them, posting a 121 ERA+ and a 1.363 WHIP over six seasons in Cleveland. Unfortunately for the Yankees, a variety of metrics suggest that time has passed. Colon didn't appear to have much left in the tank the last time he pitched in the majors. It's unlikely he has anything now. Making matters worse, according to Baseball-Reference the pitcher he's most similar to through his career is Freddy Garcia. You can't make this stuff up.

Is there any hope for Freddy Garcia?

In the aftermath of the Freddy Garcia signing I mentioned that if I felt so inspired I'd dig into the numbers to "see if there are any curiosities in his recent poor performance that might suggest a turnaround," and of course my buddy Joe beat me to the punch to a certain extent in noting that Garcia's 2010 changeup was actually a pretty effective weapon against lefties.

For my deeper look at Garcia I thought I'd analyze the PitchFX data, to see whether anything instructive or informative might arise. First, a quick look at Garcia's stats going back the last three seasons, as that's as far back as the PitchFX data goes:

Unfortunately, outside of last season Garcia's seen pretty limited action while also performing rather poorly, so these small samples aren't all that instructive, but as it's all we have they can at least provide us with some guidance.

Garcia's best performance during the last four seasons came during the nine starts he made in 2009 -- not surprisingly that season featured his best GB% since 2005 and the first time in his career he walked less than two batters per nine innings.

While Garcia strikes righties out more frequently then lefties and walks them less frequently, for whatever reason he has some issues with surrendering the long ball to righthanded batters, which is reflected in his FIP, which was higher vs. righties in every season except 2009. However, given that it's slightly harder to hit a home run at Yankee Stadium hitting righthanded than lefthanded (RHB HR Park Factor of 110 vs. LHB Park Factor of 124) -- though YS still plays as an above-average HR park for RHB -- maybe Garcia will have slightly better luck keeping the ball in the park against same-handed batters. Although given that none of the projection systems see a HR/9 lower than 1.1 (with PECOTA projecting a particularly brutal 1.4) I wouldn't go holding my breath.

Here's the horizontal and vertical break for Freddy's four main pitches (I excluded the splitter -- even though Fangraphs has wSF data for Garcia, they only have h-break and v-break for 2010, so there didn't seem to be much utility in including).

In his lone good year of 2009, Garcia's changeup was worth 3.4 runs above average, and broke about two inches less than league average horizontally and about two inches higher vertically. The pitch was even more effective in 2010, and while it essentially had league-average horizontal break, it once again broke more than two inches higher than the league, so it would appear that if Freddy can throw his change with 6-7 inches of elevation it will remain a good pitch for him.

Garcia's fastball was pretty awful last year, and actually worse than Javier Vazquez's 89mph avg., -3.5 runs above average offering. Garcia had similar H-break on his fastball, but elevated it an inch-and-a-half higher than Javy -- and nearly two inches higher than the league -- and so while elevation may be the name of the game for Freddy's change, he throws his fastball too high and as a result it more or less gets crushed.

His slider was solid in 2009, but though its H-break and V-break barely changed in 2010, he lost about a mile-and-a-half of velocity on it, which was enough to turn the pitch from an asset to a detriment. If Freddy can't get the slider back up to 81 he's going to have to limit its usage (he threw it more than a quarter of the time last season, down from 2009's 29% but way up from 2008's admittedly abbreviated 13%. In 2007 he threw it 14% of the time).

His 2010 curve was OK, but nothing to get terribly excited over. He throws it significantly slower than the league average curveball -- given the near 20-mph difference between his curve and fastball, if he locates it well it's probably a pretty nice pitch to have in his back pocket.

Unfortunately a deeper dig into some of the numbers hasn't really yielded anything profoundly positive that might suggest a stronger 2011 campaign for Freddy Garcia. He'll have to continue the effective deployment of his changeup to be of any use, while perhaps mixing in his curveball a bit more often (only 5% of the time last season) to keep hitters off balance so they're not sitting on a fat 88mph fastball.

More on Adam Warren

Didn't get enough Adam Warren the other day? Frankie Piliere had some kind words for the farm system's best-projected starter in his latest chat:

"[Comment From ZakZak: ]

Adam Warren is one of my personal favorite from the Yankees farm system, seems like he doesn't get too much love as he's always grouped with David Phelps, D.J. Mitchell, etc as a backend of the rotation starter. I'm not saying he's front line, but isn't he at least worthy of a middle of the rotation type? He's got good stuff!

Frankie Piliere: I like Warren better than the two others you mentioned. You're right that he probably doesn't get quite enough love. He's not a finesse guy. He runs up into the mid 90s at times and relies on that fastball. But his secondary stuff continues to improve. He's a middle-of-the-rotation starter."

While it seems silly to get excited over a guy who's projected as a mid-rotation starter at best, I'm still very interested in seeing what Warren can do.

Yankees sign righthanded reliever Luis Ayala

The Yankees have signed relief pitcher Luis Ayala to a minor-league contract. Per MLBTR, it is expected that Ayala will compete for a bullpen spot with the likes of Neil Cotts, Buddy Carlyle and Mark Prior.

Ayala last pitched in the Majors in 2009 and was pretty bad, throwing 40 innings of 5.63 ERA/4.67 FIP ball worth 0.0 fWAR. A quick glance at Ayala's ledger reveals that the only good season he's ever had came back in 2004 with the Expos, when he threw 90.1 innings of 2.69 ERA/3.18 FIP ball, worth 1.8 fWAR. He hasn't had a BB/9 below 2 since 2005, or a GB% above 50% since 2004 -- not that the latter is crucial for relief success, but for a guy with a 5.88 career K/9 you'd hope he'd generate his share of grounders. I suppose the career 47.3% GB% is something to hang his hat on.

In any event, this is yet another low-cost, no-risk move that will either benefit the team in the best case or be completely forgotten about if it doesn't pan out.

Yankeeist Chat Reminder | Friday, February 11, 2011

Be sure to join me for the first 2011 Yankeeist Live Chat this Friday, February 11, at 3:00 PM EST. There's a lot going on in Yankeeland (state of the rotation, bench depth, bullpen additions, Brian Cashman, etc.) and we can certainly hit on all of them.

I look forward to seeing you there!

Ten Years of Spending | 1990s edition

Much to my delight, I recently stumbled onto an excellent article by THT’s Matt Binder contemplating league spending from 2001-2010. As you’re probably aware, the Yankees' accomplishments over the past decade tend to reflect quite favorably when compared against the rest of Major League Baseball. After assessing the trends, Matt affirms:

"In each of the past 10 years, the teams that have spent the most on payroll in their division, or the second-most, have made the playoffs 49 times—27 times in the American League and 22 times in the National. During the same time, the bottom two teams in payroll spending have made the playoffs 16 times; 11 in the American and five in the National. … In conclusion, spending a lot of money is [generally] good for your team's record."

Given the polarizing nature of MLB’s drastic disparities in spending and the Yankees' reputation of being the financial juggernaut that continues to exasperate the condition, I thought it’d be fun to repeat Matt’s exercise during the 1990s. By examining spending during New York’s most recent dynasty years, perhaps we’ll be able to determine if the league was more financially equivalent back then, and if it was, whether that yielded more equitable results.

The American League East

Average percentage of league mean: 127%



During the 1990s, each member of the AL East (with the exception of the Brewers who I'll be discussing a bit later) followed a fairly linear upward trend that both demonstrated the division’s ever-increasing competitiveness and the developing financial inequality that would increasingly engulf the rest of baseball. As to be expected, most teams in this division operated well above MLB average spending; cumulatively the group catapulted past league average at a rate of 127%. Obviously, this made the Devil Rays' transition into the league as an expansion team challenging for the first few ten seasons or so -- but then again, no one said contending perennially with Big Stein’s Bombers would be a cakewalk.

Under Steinbrenner’s tutelage, the Yankees significantly hovered above the other teams in spending, even doubling the Rays' spending by the year 2000. From 1991 to 2000, the Yankees payroll simply climbed every year at what seemed liked an exponential rate. By the time the decade drew to an end, the Yankees' spending had risen over 300% ($92.9M in 2000) since the start of the decade coinciding with six postseason appearances and three World Championships. Of course, these values appear rather pedestrian nowadays as that type of money is allocated to literally a handful of guys wearing pinstripes (that means you too, Derek Jeter).

What I find particularly interesting about this timeframe though, is it signifies a period where the Orioles were actually “plus spenders” in relation to the league mean, and the Red Sox were largely a footnote in overall success despite maintaining a competitively operating franchise in terms of payroll (in addition to notching three postseason appearances).

The American League Central

Average percentage of league mean: 87%

The AL Central isn’t quite so neatly organized in terms of overall trending and was the lowest-spending division on average, with the Indians being the only the team consistently outspending the league mean. What’s even more incredible though, was how the Indians operated in contrast to the rest of the teams in the grouping.

The MLB average spending from 1991-2000 was approximately $31.3M. From 1996-2000, the Indians spending spiked dramatically above the MLB mean and hovered around $61.8M. Although a World Championship was never in their cards, they did manage to obtain five postseason appearances (one climaxing in a 4-2 World Series defeat to the Braves), and were clearly the dominating force in the AL Central during the latter half of the decade both fiscally and statistically. On a slightly derisive note, it’s also the last time I remember a Cleveland baseball team upholding sustained success in my lifetime.

During the 1994-1997 seasons, the Brewers were reassigned to the AL Central. During this time span the MLB spending average was approximately $33.2M. The Brewers countered with a payroll approximately 60% that amount averaging approximately $20.2M during those years. By this point, MLB was in a state of flux in terms of divisional alignment. Once 1998 rolled around, Bud Selig had the team repositioned once more to their current residence, the NL Central.

The American League West

Average percentage of league mean: 100%

The AL West essentially mirrored the trending of the rest of baseball. The only real fluctuations were those of the Rangers and Athletics which basically offset each other in terms of cumulative spending totals. During the 90s the Rangers were spending an average of $44.5M with substantial spikes in 1999 and 2000 ($81.3M and $70.7M, respectively) on players like Nolan Ryan, Ruben Sierra, Rafael Palmeiro, Jose Canseco, Kevin Brown, Will Clark, Juan Gonzalez, Ivan Rodriguez and Kenny Rogers.

Around 1996, the Athletics began their descent into frugality which eventually led to their mystical-financially-prudent-sabermetric-approach-to-survival otherwise known as Moneyball, while Alex Rodriguez (who would later cripple Texas’ checkbook) was still categorized in the major-production-at-an-only-moderately-expensive-cost column for Seattle. These three teams netted eight postseason appearances while the then-hapless Angels (who would decidedly turn it around in the 2000s) idled in the world of relatively cheap mediocrity.

The National League East

Average percentage of league mean: 92%

The Braves' dominance of the decade was unsurprisingly underscored by a willingness to spend. In a division that spent an average of $33.3M, or 92% of MLB mean spending, Atlanta consistently went above and beyond. From 1992 through the remainder of the decade they averaged $52.5M, topping out at $82.7M in 2000. During that time, the Braves accumulated nine postseason appearances and a World Championship in 1995. Given the effectiveness of Atlanta’s out-of-this-world rotation stewarded by Greg Maddux, John Smoltz, and Tom Glavine, I can only imagine the angst experienced by fans of NL teams not hailing out of Georgia. What I can imagine, though, are the feelings inspired by one team who did manage to beat the pride of NL East when it counted most, on multiple occasions, mind you (sorry, too much?).

Meanwhile, the Montreal Expos' spending maintained a fairly consistent level of “pitiful” as it rested at approximately $17.5M. The cost of a skinflint-oriented operation was zero postseason appearances and increased motivation to relocate.

The Marlins, on the other hand, while largely operating under MLB average at approximately $26M, at least had the excuse of being a newly founded franchise (which would then have to compete with another Florida-based team later in the decade). However, there was that exceptional 1997 season when Florida was freakishly good, resulting in a World Series Championship at the inflated cost of $47.7M in expenses (nearly doubling their average up until that point).

The National League Central

Average percentage of league mean: 92%

Unfortunately, the NL Central left quite a bit to be desired as it typically does. The division averaged 92% of the league’s mean spending, and the results were mostly unmemorable. The paltry Pirates matched expectations as they fulfilled their most-likely-to-quit-baseball-and-try-a-new-sport superlative. They averaged a $21.1M payroll over the course of the decade which was weighed down by a measly $9.1M in 1997. To really put 1997 in perspective, the top-spending Reds outspent the Pirates by $37.1M. Although Pittsburgh did have playoff appearances in 1991 and 1992, they also eventually morphed into the organization boasting the most consecutive losing seasons (18 and counting!) thus disgracing a typically well represented sports town.

As for the Reds, they primarily spent the most dollars in the quest for divisional supremacy before ultimately being usurped by the Cubs in 1998. These two lousy teams managed a combined postseason appearance total of two over the course of 10 years and demonstrated fine examples of generally inept organizational execution (perhaps matched most closely by the current rendition of the Mets).

The National League West

Average percentage of league mean: 107%

The NL West displays the most consistency of any of the divisions in terms of trending. Communally, the NL West's dollars spent ($38.8M) averages slightly above league average. This is especially impressive as it contained two new teams (the Rockies and Diamondbacks) who both veered away from Tampa Bay’s try-to-get-ballplayers-to-play-for-free business model.

The Dodgers were fairly steadfast in leading the league at $46.9M, although in the final two years surveyed, their total spiked rather precipitously (thanks in large part to Gary Sheffield and NY “fan-favorite” Kevin Brown). Unfortunately for the LA faithful, the team had relatively little to show for it. Thankfully, the Padres, who were fourth in total spending, were content in taking the majority of losses over the course of these years, and graciously accepted/embraced their one playoff appearance.

The Diamondbacks came out of the gates aggressively in 1999 (their second season as a franchise) with a payroll surpassing the $70M plateau and were rewarded with an NLDS thrashing compliments of the Braves. Since then, their big spending sustainability has dwindled given the limitations of their market.

Division vs. Division

All in all, the AL East completely overshadowed the rest of baseball in spending during the Yankees' late ‘90s glory years, and the Bombers generally overshadowed their competition in both spending along with results. It is important to remember though, that during this decade, the league was changing. Technically, the intraleague divisions weren't established until 1994 when the National League was expanded to 14 teams (and interleague play didn't begin until 1997).

While big money never guarantees anything, it clearly worked to Steinbrenner’s advantage during this period. Consider the weighted averages of dollars spent against the league average over the years.

New York Yankees	1.484	(1st in division, 6 playoff appearances)
Atlanta Braves	1.324	(1st in division, 9 playoff appearances)
Los Angeles Dodgers	1.271	(1st in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Boston Red Sox	1.263	(2nd in division, 3 playoff appearances)
Baltimore Orioles	1.234	(3rd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Toronto Blue Jays	1.212	(4th in division, 3 playoff appearances)
Texas Rangers	1.187	(1st in division, 3 playoff appearances)
New York Mets	1.167	(2nd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Chicago Cubs	1.099	(1st in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Cleveland Indians	1.077	(1st in division, 5 playoff appearances)
Cincinnati Reds	1.076	(2nd in division, 1 playoff appearance)
San Francisco Giants	1.075	(2nd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
St. Louis Cardinals	1.018	(3rd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Chicago White Sox	0.996	(2nd in division, 2playoff appearances)
Seattle Mariners	0.995	(2nd in division, 3 playoff appearances)
Los Angeles Angels	0.941	(3rd in division, 0 playoff appearances)
Detroit Tigers	0.904	(3rd in division, 0 playoff appearances)
Oakland Athletics	0.882	(4th in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Kansas City Royals	0.874	(4th in division, 0 playoff appearances)
San Diego Padres	0.872	(3rd in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Houston Astros	0.867	(4th in division, 3 playoff appearances)
Philadelphia Phillies	0.859	(3rd in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Colorado Rockies	0.763	(4th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Milwaukee Brewers	0.754	(5th in division, 0 playoff appearances)
Minnesota Twins	0.701	(5th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Pittsburgh Pirates	0.621	(6th in division, 2 playoff appearances)
Florida Marlins	0.568	(4th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Montreal Expos (Nats)	0.498	(5th in division, 0 playoff appearances)
Arizona Diamondbacks	0.360	(5th in division, 1 playoff appearance)
Tampa Bay Devil Rays	0.257	(5th in division, 0 playoff appearances)

Without ample spending, the “Core-4” may have been unable to remain intact just as the supreme pitching of Atlanta might not have been under team control for nearly as long. If anything, I also have one more reason to appreciate the Astros' organization, as they achieved three playoff appearances despite operating under the average MLB budget and holding steadfast as the second-to-last in spending within their division -- basically acting as the “Billy Beane squad” of the NL West.

For those skeptics out there, consider this. The top two teams in each American League division in terms of team payroll made the postseason 23 times. The same set of criteria yielded 19 appearances from the NL for a combined 42 total postseason opportunities. On the other hand, the two lowest spending teams from each division within the AL reached the playoffs only two times and only six in the NL combining for a measly eight total.

Granted, the ‘90s were a strange time in terms of postseason play. The 1991-1993 seasons did not have the ALDS round and there were no playoffs in 1994 altogether. With that being said, I’m not sure how drastic of a difference it would have made for the small market teams. Perhaps where an opportunity might have arisen had there been additional playoff slots would be for the “middle-of-the-pack #3” teams who were on the threshold of competing more regularly such as the Cardinals or White Sox.

Here’s a more granular breakdown.

Top two teams in payroll per year that made the playoffs:

AL East: (1992, 1993 Blue Jays) (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 Yankees) (1996, 1997 Orioles) (1992, 1999 Red Sox)

AL Central: (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Indians)

AL West: (1992 Athletics) (1995, 1997, 2000 Mariners) (1996, 1998, 1999 Rangers)

NL East: (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 Braves) (1997 Marlins) (1999, 2000 Mets)

NL Central: (1994 Reds) (1996, 2000 Cardinals) (1998 Cubs) (1999 Astros)

NL West: (1995 Rockies) (1996 Dodgers) (1999 Diamondbacks)

American League total: 23

National League total: 19

MLB total: 42

Bottom two teams in payroll per year that made the playoffs:

AL East: (1995 Red Sox)
AL Central: None
AL West: (2000 Athletics)
NL East: (1991 Braves)
NL Central: (1997 Astros)
NL West: (1995 Dodgers) (1996 Padres) (1997, 2000 Giants)

American League total: 2
National League total: 6
MLB total: 8

15 highest spending in relation to league average:

1. 1999 Yankees (1.830 times the league average) [World Champions]
2. 1998 Orioles (1.745) [no playoffs]
3. 1999 Rangers (1.688)
4. 2000 Yankees (1.664) [World Champions]
5. 1996 Yankees (1.631) [World Champions]
6. 2000 Dodgers (1.618) [did not make playoffs]
7. 1995 Blue Jays (1.581) [did not make playoffs]
8. 1998 Yankees (1.566) [World Champions]
9. 1999 Braves (1.559)
10. 1997 Yankees (1.556)
11. 1999 Indians (1.533)
12. 1996 Orioles (1.523)
13. 1996 Braves (1.498) [World Champions]
14. 1993 Jays (1.495) [World Champions]
15. 1999 Red Sox (1.489)


15 lowest spending in relation to league average*:

1. 1998 Expos (Nats) (0.228)
2. 1997 Pirates (0.239)
3. 1992 Indians (0.273)
4. 2000 Twins (0.280)
5. 1993 Rockies (0.289)
6. 1999 Marlins (0.315)
7. 1999 Twins (0.340)
8. 1999 Expos (0.340)
9. 1998 Pirates (0.341)
10. 1999 Royals (0.343)
11. 2000 Marlins (0.356)
12. 1995 Expos (0.382)
13. 2000 Royals (0.414)
14. 1994 Padres (0.428)
15. 1997 Tigers (0.429)

*Of the teams qualified, not one made the postseason during the respective year listed.

Suffice it to say, the numbers speak for themselves. In regard to the questions listed in my thesis above, I’d say the answers are fairly self evident.

A) Was the league was more financially equivalent back then? No, not really. While the overall dollars spent were less back then, the proportions of payroll allocation trending behaved in much the same way as it does currently.
B) If it was, did it yielded more equitable results?
C) Were the results as disproportionately skewed? I guess that depends on who you ask. Those of us who are Yankees or Braves fans have no gripe with the way things worked out.

Resources:
USA Today MLB salary database
Baseball-Reference (Playoff and World Series Index)

Bizarre Moves from Seasons Past: The non-signing of Ted Lilly in the 2006-2007 offseason

Ah, the Bizarre Moves from Seasons Past series. I had a lot of fun with this last offseason, but I hadn't penned one this year, primarily due to the fact that no ideas for new posts had popped into my head. Until now. I previously covered the trading of Mike Lowell, the non-signing of David Ortiz, the non-signing of Andy Pettitte after the 2003 season, the non-signing of Vladimir Guerrero and the non-signing of Carlos Beltran.

As fate would have it, the last time we published a "Bizarre Moves" post it focused on Ted Lilly, and once again the man born Theodore Roosevelt Lilly III takes center stage (after a cameo yesterday).

As noted in that prior BMfSP post, the Yankees had questionably traded Lilly in a three-way deal between the A's and the Tigers that resulted in New York acquiring the heralded Jeff Weaver, who spent a tumultuous year-and-a-half in pinstripes before essentially being run out of town and replaced by a nearing-the-end-of-the-line Kevin Brown.

However, despite dishing arguably their best left-handed pitching prospect since Andy Pettitte and getting garbage in return, the Yankees had an opportunity to bring Lilly back into the fold during the 2006-2007 offseason, as Lilly hit free agency for the first time. Despite three above-average seasons (and one terrible year in 2005), I seem to recall most of the Yankee blogs I was reading at the time being against the idea of a Lilly reunion (although I'm having trouble remembering who expressed these opinions), fearing he'd be overpaid and ineffective. It was also thought that the Yankees would likely end up getting Daisuke Matsuzaka, until the Red Sox shocked the league and outbid every other team by a considerable margin.

In the aftermath of missing out on Matsuzaka, Brian Cashman followed one of the most ill-advised recommendations in team history and signed a Japanese hurler of his own in Kei Igawa. Igawa cost $26 million in posting fees and signed a five-year, $20 million that finally ends after this coming season. Nine days after the Yankees won the rights to Igawa, the Cubs signed Ted Lilly to a four-year, $40 million contract on December 8, or $6 million less than the Yankees ended up having to spend on Igawa. Read that last sentence to yourself again. Now feel free to puke.

We're going to do this two ways. First we'll do a graphical rundown of Lilly vs. Weaver in the three years leading up to the 2002 trade (Lilly and Weaver both conveniently debuted in 1999); the one-and-half seasons that followed; Lilly vs. Brown through 2005; Lilly vs. his 2006 Yankee equivalent, which in this case would we'll choose Jaret Wright, as he appears to be the least likely of the Yankees' top four that season to have been on the Yankees had they had Lilly; then Lilly vs. Igawa in 2007; Lilly vs. Darrell Rasner in 2008, as there's probably zero chance Rasner would've been on that team had they gotten 200-plus innings out of Lilly; Lilly vs. Sergio Mitre in 2009; and finally Lilly vs. Javier Vazquez in 2010, as it seems unlikely the team would've been compelled to trade for Home Run Javy had Lilly been on the staff.

This entire exercise of course requires quite a bit of imagination as well as a a blissfully ignorant acceptance of Michael Kay's beloved fallacy of the predetermined outcome, as obviously the events and personnel on the Yankees would have changed quite a bit if they had indeed wound up holding on to Lilly all these years. But for our purposes, we're just going to assume everything stayed the same, since it's impossible to construct every single possible scenario that could have played out involving Yankee teams of the last nine years.

You can click here to download the spreadsheet used to create these charts if you are so inclined.

Remember, even though it says "NYY ERA," etc., from 1999 through 2002 Pre-Trade the "NYY" numbers are Jeff Weaver's while on the Tigers. Interestingly, Weaver basically outperformed Lilly in every facet of the game in the three-and-a-half seasons prior to the 2002 trade, which I suppose supports why Brian Cashman acquired Weaver in the first place. Lilly was actually having a pretty solid 2002 for the Yanks (3.40 ERA, though a 4.25 FIP; however Lilly has outpitched his FIP in almost every season of his career due to higher-than-you'd like walk rates and something of a propensity for surrendering the long ball. He's been able to flourish in spite of this due to strand rates mostly in the mid-70% range and not allowing a BABIP above .300 since 2001. While we know BABIP fluctuates fairly wildly from year to year, nine straight seasons of sub-.300 BABIPs may be more indicative of a repeatable skill than luck), although Weaver was having an absurd campaign himself, flashing a 3.18 ERA/3.17 FIP and 3.3 fWAR -- a mighty impressive total given that the season was barely half over at the time of the trade (July 5).

Weaver would get the best of Lilly through the end of 2002 (1.1 fWAR to 0.1), as the latter spent part of the remainder of the season on the disabled list and when he wasn't injured, simply didn't pitch very well. However, the tables began to turn the following year, as Lilly would go on to post the strongest season of his career up to that point, while Weaver struggled mightily and was eventually more or less run of of town after posting a 5.99 ERA (though only a 4.26 FIP). Since then it's more or less been all Lilly compared to who the Yankees wound up using instead, with the exception of 2005, which was Lillly's worst season since his sophomore campaign and resulted in Kevin Brown actually out-fWARing him. In the eight-and-a-half seasons since the trade, Lilly has accumulated 21.9 fWAR compared to his Yankee counterparts' 11.0.

It becomes even more glaring when you look at what Lilly did over the duration of the four-year, $40 million deal he signed with the Cubs and that the Yankees were inexplicably so reluctant to dole out. Here are charts of the last four seasons of Yankee pitching staffs, and where Lilly would have ranked had he been on the team:

Lilly would have been the third-best pitcher on the 2007 and 2008 staffs, and believe it or not, the second-best pitcher on the 2009 World Champion staff. Lilly would've likely only have been the fourth-best starter among last season's group, but plugging him in to fill the spot vacated by Andy Pettitte would've essentially kept the well-oiled machine going instead of having to rely on Dustin Moseley, et. al.

Now one could make the case that perhaps Lilly's numbers wouldn't have ended up quite as shiny had he pitched these last four seasons in the AL East instead of the NL Central, but given Lilly's success in the American League, I don't think he would've performed too dramatically differently. Lilly ended up accumulating 12.5 fWAR during his four-year deal with the Cubs, while the Yankees mustered 0.9 fWAR out of what likely would've been Lilly's spot. Lilly ultimately provided the Cubs with $53.5 million of value -- a $13.5 million surplus. What do the Yankees have to show for Igawa? According to Fangraphs, he was so bad in 2007 he actually should've paid the Yankees $1.2 million for letting him "pitch," and the Yankees ultimately completely wasted $46 million that should've been allocated much, much differently.

While we'll never truly know why the Yankees decided to pass on a reunion with Lilly -- who reportedly wanted to come back to the Bronx, as his agent gave the Yankees a chance to match the Cubs' offer -- the decision to do so in the 2006-2007 offseason definitely ranks up there with some of the more baffling moves mad by the front office during the past decade.

The 2011 PECOTA Projections

Baseball Prospectus released the first iteration of its 2011 PECOTA projections (the bane of Mike's existence) yesterday, and my initial impression is that they are quite a bit more favorable to the Yankees than the Marcels were (however, this is due in part to their being park-adjusted).

In particular, the Yankees' big bats -- Mark Teixeira, Alex Rodriguez and Robinson Cano -- each project a good deal more in line with what we'd expect their SLGs to look like. PECOTA has Tex at .275/.376/.510 (up from Marcel's .496 SLG); A-Rod at .273/.370/.517 (Marcel had his SLG at .486); and Cano's projected PECOTA line is .299/.347/.488 (Marcel: .476 SLG). It appears PECOTA has apparently done something of a turnaround on A-Rod; two years ago Nate Silver had A-Rod pegged for 27 home runs in 2011; today PECOTA has Alex projected to hit 34 home runs. Sign me up.

Yesterday Jason took a look at the numbers and posted his proposed lineup; the Yankee starters project to hit .269/.344/.452 -- in 2010 the team as a whole hit .267/.350/.436, and while I hate to see any drop in OBP, I could live with it if it meant more power. Oh, and Jesus Montero is projected to hit 18 home runs and SLG .471, which would be the fourth-highest mark on the team. Jesus saves, indeed.

On the pitching side of the ledger, Jay Jaffe does the legwork for us in a quick-and-dirty rundown of the contenders for the back end of the rotation, and notes that, much to everyone's chagrin, Sergio Mitre may actually not be the worst choice ever (at least among what the Yankees currently have available), while our man Hector Noesi and his pinpoint control also rates well. PECOTA really hates Ivan Nova, and while I'm willing to give him a shot to see if he can produce as a starter, noted prospect maven John Manuel sees Nova's future ultimately in the bullpen.

In fact, Manuel has a couple of interesting things to say about the Yankees' back-of-the-rotation prospects in that NoMaas interview:

SJK: Of the Yankees projectable, back-of-the-rotation arms (Hector Noesi, David Phelps, Ivan Nova, Adam Warren), who do you like the most? Do you think any of those guys could surprise us with a little more upside?

John Manuel: Noesi commands the fastball best of that group, followed by Warren. There's not a ton of difference between them, but Noesi's breaking ball, while fringy, is better than Warren's. If you're a back-of-the-rotation guy, you better throw strikes or you'll lose your spot in a hurry. That's what those two guys do. Phelps does it less, but his secondary pitches improved a bit last year. Nova always has had the best arm, we've been ranking him since he was in low Class A. Last year he threw harder, and with all the Yanks' offseason misses on pitchers, Nova has a good chance to earn a starting role in New York. I do not expect him to be a starter long-term because he has such power stuff and inconsistent control (not to mention command) that he fits better in the bullpen. I have to say overall I'm not a Phelps believer, but I've been wrong before.

Speaking of Warren, PECOTA apparently loves itself some Adam Warren, rather shockingly projecting 100.1 innings of 4.44 ERA ball with a 6.6 K/9, 3.4 BB/9 and 0.9 HR/9, worth 1.8 WARP. I say shockingly not as a knock on Warren's talent, but because he's never pitched above AA and only has 10 career starts at that level, though he did acquit himself nicely, throwing 54.1 innings of 3.15 ERA/2.56 FIP ball. I'm not entirely certain what to conclude from his projections, as they would make him the fourth-best starter (by WARP) on the Yankees right now. I'd be willing to totally write them off if not for the fact that CAIRO basically came to the same conclusion on Warren, with his 0.9 WAR (in 85 innings) the fourth-highest mark among Yankee starting pitchers. Oliver also seems to think fairly highly of Warren, projecting 122 innings of 4.47 ERA ball, worth 1.3 WAR.

A year ago Mike Axisa profiled Warren and concluded that "His stuff is firm and he’s as polished as they come, which is a great recipe for a quick mover and surefire big leaguer. Warren will never be an ace, but he’ll be a rock solid back-end arm or middle reliever that will provide a ton of value when he’s cheap. Believe it or not, the Yankees do a very good job of pumping out useful big league arms, and Warren is just another part coming down the assembly line." Based on these numbers it looks like Warren could have a shot at becoming something a little bit more than just another assembly line part.

Message to Yankee fans: Redirect the vitriol (a preemptive strike at crazy comments)

Earlier today, Larry contemplated the unlikely possibility of a third reunion between Nick Johnson and the Yankees. Now I’m fairly certain that my pal is going to take some flack for this, so I’ve thrown together a quick piece rant imploring our readership to consider musings such as this objectively, before proceeding to tear my fellow writer a new one.

Anyway, the formula is simple:

Nick Johnson at a very discounted rate equates to inexpensive-quality OBP. Inexpensive-quality OBP outweighs both the potentiality of player frailty and feeble production of some of the current alternatives (i.e., Ramiro Pena).

Now, given our site’s emphasis on data-driven analytics, it’s easy to understand why we would endorse guys such as Johnson, or Javier Vazquez, or even, wait for it, Carl Pavano (part deux). If the numbers crunch and an organizational need is met, we typically buy in.

However, much of the New York fanbase is a tad more cynical (to put it kindly). Why bother with a guy like Johnson? He basically requires surgery every time he sneezes. Why bother with a guy like Vazquez, or Zack Greinke (even though he's not a free agent)? They can’t handle the exorbitant pressure inherent with the Bronx. Why bother with a guy like Carl Pavano? He’s less valuable than a [insert noun here].

See where I’m going with this? There’s always a vague explanation composed of intangible points proving why someone will inevitably flounder. And dammit, Brian Cashman (the root of all bad decisions) always seems to ignore all our passion-derived-predictively-accurate-angst, instead choosing the path of not-so-crafty-but-definitely-nonsensical-BS-free-agent-signing. Right? Right.

Here’s the plight. While the masses would explode if Carl resurfaced in pinstripes, the truth is he makes sense as a rotation solution to some degree. He’s simply better than the current options, and better players tend to produce better results. As much as I hated Pavano’s excuses for not playing the last time around, when I look at his numbers the past two seasons with the Twins I understand why he earned that second year from Minnesota’s front office. Maybe they’re that stupid/naive/foolish, etc., or perhaps good pitching options are, in actuality, quite thin these days. In other words, his skill set holds definitive value on the market to the extent that he was probably the best pitcher not named Cliff Lee who was available. Attach a pretend name to Carl's stats (such as Marl Savano) and he’s suddenly not so bad!

Consider Focus on the stats. Put aside “grit” or “heart” or “clubhouse presence” and just look at the results. Now weigh one set of results against another; by dehumanizing the game just a tiny bit, we can develop a much greater appreciation for Cashman’s approach and responsibility as general manager.

We all know that New York’s greatest asset is their cash. A cheap alternative such as Nick Johnson -- who wouldn’t cost future draft picks or top prospects and is on a minor league incentive based deal -- means almost nothing to the organization. If Eric Chavez or Mark Prior flops this spring, who cares? Seriously. They’re cut and the team moves on to the next scrub one. If lightning in a bottle is to be found, the Yankees get a huge return on the investment -- such was the case with Marcus Thames.

Anyway, if you completely disagree with me, feel free to leave your two cents. I look forward to verbally jousting.

Whither Nick the Stick?

Last offseason the statistically-obsessed among the Yankee faithful rejoiced upon the news that Brian Cashman had brought former Yankee farmhand, OBP machine and Yankeeist favorite Nick Johnson back into the fold. The Stick was supposed to fit seamlessly into Johnny Damon's recently vacated #2 slot, right where his .402 career on-base percentage belonged.

The injury-plagued Johnson muddled through an exceptionally poor April, though his .138/.383/.224 line was made significantly less miserable by (what else?) a stellar OBP, not to mention the fact that he also fell victim to some terribly bad luck on balls in play (.194 BABIP, 6th-worst in the AL that month). Just when it looked like the Stick was about to break out and assume his rightful role as an offensive force to be reckoned with (.286/.412/.643 in five May contests), he (surprise, surprise) was pulled from the lineup on May 7 against Boston, eventually had to have surgery that was initially expected to keep him out until the end of July, and of course, ultimately never made it back to the playing field in 2010. The Yankees easily declined the mutual option they held for Johnson on October 27, and the Stick hit free agency.

I opined back in November that Johnson might be useful as a bench piece were he willing to come back at a severely reduced salary, and given that we've heard barely a peep with regards to teams being interested in The Stick, he's still available and the fact that the Yankees are looking into upgrading their bench in any way shape or form (as evidenced by the Eric Chavez and Ronnie Belliard signings), I'd still endorse a Nick the Stick reunion. I know he can't field anywhere other than 1B, and therefore doesn't meet the team's needs for an extra glove, but still, it's impossible to ignore his on-base percentage projections.

Bill James projects Johnson at .264/.411/.427, .374 wOBA in 415 PAs; Marcel says .256/.384/.488, .346 wOBA in 306 PAs; CAIRO has .258/.394/.398, .360 wOBA in 301 PAs; Oliver calls for a .262/.394/.397, .361 wOBA line in 357 PAs; and PECOTA projects a .256/.404/.395 line in 450 PAs, which, as Steven R. from RAB noted, is PECOTA's second-highest OBP projection for all players in Major League Baseball. If you do a straight, unweighted average of those five OBP projections, you get .397. Injury issues and fielding limitations aside, whoever ends up signing Johnson is going to get quite an OBP bargain -- assuming he can stay on the field.

Given that Cash likely has Johnson's medicals permanently etched in his brain, I can only imagine he wants no part of a third go-round with the Stick, and Johnson's continued availability indicates that every other MLB team feels similarly. However, Johnson's lack of durability would not only make him an ideal buy-low candidate, but also dictates that his best use at this point in his career would be in a part-time role. I imagine he and his agent are still trying to sell his talents as a starting first baseman, but if they continue to get no interest at whatever salary level Johnson's looking for, maybe he'd be willing to bite the bullet, come back to the Yankees in a reduced role and actually provide some of the production the team thought it was getting in 2010.

One last word in defense of Brian Cashman

I've gone on record several times backing Yankee General Manager Brian Cashman up this winter. While I certainly don't think he's perfect (I'm still not satisfied with the reasoning behind not giving Joba Chamberlain another chance in the rotation), and it's undoubtedly been an unexpectedly difficult offseason for Yankee fans, I still believe Cashman is the best man for the job and I think he's done everything within his power to improve the Yankees. Reader and friend of the blog Wayne, who I agree with on a good majority of Yankee-related issues, has made no secret of his disdain for Brian Cashman, and once again took Cash to task in the comment section of the Eric Chavez-Ronnie Belliard post. I started to respond to Wayne in the comments, but the response began taking on a life of its own and felt like it merited its own post.

I appreciate Wayne's fire as always, but I just can't get too rankled about a couple of non-roster invites to spring training. There's no harm in trying to see if either of these players has anything left to the point that they'd be more serviceable bench players than Ramiro Pena. It's not like Cash signed Chavez to contend to be the starting third baseman. And Justin Maxwell's nothing to write home about, but he's probably an upgrade over Greg Golson. Really, it's not like our 24th and 25th men are going to make or break the season.

Regarding Wayne's dissatisfaction with the lack of an apparent backup plan in the event that Cashman lost out on Cliff Lee, I'm willing to concede it's possible he misplayed those negotiations, but given Lee's apparent yearning to get back to Philly, I still don't know that things would have gone any differently had Cash come out with a CC Sabathia-style 7-year, $140M opening salvo at the beginning of November. I mean, perhaps if Cash had done something like that, then Ruben Amaro Jr. doesn't even think about trying to reacquire Lee. However, pretty much everything we heard from Lee's camp was that they didn't even want to field offers until the Winter Meetings. I have to imagine Cash at least made Lee aware of what the Yankees were willing to do financially back during that first trip to Arkansas on November 10, and I think it's pretty clear that Lee's stonewalling meant he'd give Philly as much time as it needed to put together a competitive offer. I suppose one could counter by saying the Yanks should've offered $180 million (and given how much heartburn we've all suffered as a result of the Lee spurning, this almost doesn't seem so crazy) but it's tough to blame the team for not wanting to give the richest contract in the history of the game to a 32-year-old pitcher who'd be near 40 by the time it ended. In the aftermath of what happened with Rafael Soriano, don’t you think ownership would’ve authorized Cash to go as high as it took to get Lee? That they stood firm tells me that at the end of the day, even the Yanks had a limit as to how far they were willing to go for a starting pitcher, even one as great as Lee is.

I am also willing to concede that perhaps Cash could’ve been a tad more aggressive at the outset of free agency, given the possibility that he’d miss Lee and the fact that Andy Pettitte appeared headed for retirement at the culmination of the 2010 ALCS. However, it's not as if the market was dripping with talent. Arguably the best starter available was Hiroki Kuroda, who wound up re-upping with the Dodgers for one year, $12 million on November 15 in what appears to have been a substantially below-market deal. Kuroda was actually the 17th-most valuable pitcher in the NL last season (4.2 fWAR), putting up a season worth $16.9 million. In 2010-2011 offseason dollars, he could've conceivably held out for a contract near $20 million. Of course, no one thinks Hiroki Kuroda is a $20 million/year pitcher, but it probably would've taken at least $15 million a year to get Kuroda away from LA -- and do you really want Brian Cashman to be giving a pitcher entering his age 36 season who has spent the last three years in the NL West $15 million a year?

The only other free agent pitchers even worth thinking about were Jake Westbrook, Jon Garland and Jorge de la Rosa, to whom I say no, no and hell no to, respectively. Had he made it to free agency I would've made a case for old friend Ted Lilly -- who I actually have a post scheduled about for tomorrow -- but the Dodgers re-signed him before the season even ended. Cashman literally had no chance to even go after Lilly.

Even after seemingly every name brand free agent pitcher came off the board there was still one name available, a pitcher who was the 11th-most valuable righthander in the American League last season, but a name who infantile Yankee fans couldn't stomach the idea that Cashman would even initiate talks with, despite the fact that his primary responsibility as GM of the Yankees is to make his team better. I can only imagine the anti-Cashman crew would've been apoplectic had Brian re-signed Carl Pavano, because, you know, adding a 3.2 fWAR pitcher to your rotation is terrible.

I admit, I was a tad disappointed that the Yankees seemingly missed out on Jeff Francis -- who seemed like he would've been a nice fit in the back end of the rotation, but (rightly) felt he'd have more of an opportunity in Kansas City -- and Justin Duchscherer, who might have been an even more enticing upgrade if management hadn't just gotten burned by Nick Johnson -- who I still believe was a highly worthwhile gamble last winter, but ask a member of the anti-Cash crew and they'll claim they knew Johnson was going to get injured all along.

Ultimately, I just don’t quite understand what the anti-Cashman contingent expects him to do. This has been perhaps the most unprecedented offseason in baseball history with regards to players leaving money on the table, from Lee, to Gil Meche to Pettitte. Cashman can’t force these players to come to New York. I think we Yankee fans need to take a step back sometimes and realize that just because a given baseball player is awesome or seems to make perfect sense to try to add to the roster, it does not mean that they automatically have to/want to come play for the Yankees. Brian Cashman does not have a mind-control device. It does not work that way.

For whatever Cashman’s faults may be as a team-builder, I don’t see how anyone can get on his ability to field a potent offense. No team in MLB has a higher wOBA (.351) over the last 10 seasons than the Yankees. Cash knows the Yankees’ bread-and-butter is patience and power, and those traits have been duly (and dually) reflected in the team’s stat ledger: Highest OBP in baseball since 2001 (.354), and second-highest slugging (.452, .001 points behind Boston’s .453).

Now on the flip side, Cashman’s White Whale to a certain extent has probably been pitching evaluation. Jeff Weaver, Kevin Brown, Jaret Wright, Carl Pavano, just to name a few (of course, it's not entirely clear how responsible Cash was for a number of these disappointments) of the pitchers that have been acquired on Cash's watch and have not lived up to expectations. However, since gaining full autonomy after the 2005 season, the Yankees went on to have one of their strongest drafts ever in 2006, and come 2009, the Yankees won their 27th championship with a rotation anchored by Cashman free agents Sabathia and A.J. Burnett, and a lights-out set-up man in Phil Hughes, the pitcher Cash refused to trade to the Twins for Johan Santana.

And ultimately, this is where I really get lost when it comes to Cashman-bashing. The team he assembled in 2009 wins it all, but somehow it doesn't count because Cashman did his "checkbook GM" thing and bought all the best players. Fast-forward two years later, and Cashman is still trying to purchase the best players money can buy, but their disinterest in coming to New York and/or deciding to retire -- despite the Yankees having the highest offer -- means Cash is a lousy GM and should have had a backup plan that somehow included the best free agent pitchers still being on the market after the Yankees missed out on Lee. If you want to believe that Cashman blew the Lee negotiations and should've been signing Kuroda, Garland and/or Westbrook in November while waiting on Lee, then I don't know what to tell you. I'm sure Lee would've felt really wanted if the Yankees went out and started filling out their rotation because they weren't 100% convinced they could get him.

I feel bad for the Yankee fans who think the team has a lousy GM; I really do. Can you imagine if your favorite team were run by Dayton Moore? Or Ed Wade? Or Kenny Williams? Or Omar Minaya? What's so bad about exercising a little restraint when Brian Cashman asks us to "be patient?" He cannot pull a rabbit out of a hat. People are upset that he's signing retreads like Freddy Garcia and Bartolo Colon to minor league deals, but who else is out there? These guys cost pennies on the dollar, and can be cut the moment they don't work out. Someone's gotta account for approximately 400 innings out of the back-end of the rotation. It's not as if Felix Hernandez or Jon Lester are available.

The Yankees have, for the first time in a long time, some very interesting possibilities down on the farm right now -- possibilities that could turn into legitimate Major Leaguers, or perhaps help acquire one if the right deal presented itself. But right now, that's all they are -- possibilities. For all the glowing reports we hear about a given Killer B, or how stacked the rotations are going to be at Trenton and Scranton, at the end of the day they're still all lottery tickets. That's what Brian Cashman is talking about when he's asking the fans to exercise patience. There are 29 other teams in Major League Baseball; no one is handing Cashman an experienced, valuable starting pitcher for free. The organization rightly needs to see what it has on its hands, and in the cases of the pitchers with the highest upside -- Manny Banuelos, Dellin Betances and Andrew Brackman -- that's likely going to take at least another year.

In any event, I'm sick of having to defend Brian Cashman. I wasn't intending this response to end up being a referendum on his offseason, but I guess that's what wound up happening, and it feels pretty good. This will also hopefully be the last time I am driven to defend Cash. I'm excited for spring training, excited as hell to see what the season holds for the Yankees, and excited to know that -- based on the information available to us -- Brian Cashman has done everything he can to make the Yankees as good as possible.